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  INTRODUCTION   
Cybersecurity is a popular topic these days. In October 2016, 
a distributed denial-of-service attack (DDoS attack) cut off mil-
lions of people from a considerable chunk of the Internet for a 
few hours.1 In a separate incident, intelligence officials in the 
United States accused the Russian government of using cyberat-
tacks to interfere with the American electoral process.2 In late 
2015, hackers used BlackEnergy malware to shut down sections 
of the power system in Ukraine for several hours.3 A year later, 
Ukraine’s capital city of Kiev experienced its own power disrup-
tion after an attack with a different type of malware, which re-
searchers have named Crash Override.4 These incidents are in 
addition to the ransomware, phishing campaigns, and data 
breaches that were already causing newsworthy incidents 
around the world. 
The stakes are continually getting higher. According to the 
World Economic Forum, ineffective cybersecurity may cost the 
 
 1. Bruce Schneier, Lessons from the Dyn DDoS Attack, SCHNEIER ON SE-
CURITY (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/11/ 
lessons_from_th_5.html. 
 2. NAT’L CYBERSECURITY AND COMMC’NS INTEGRATION CTR., DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC. & FBI, JOINT ANALYSIS REPORT, GRIZZLY STEPPE – RUSSIAN 
MALICIOUS CYBER ACTIVITY 1 (2016), https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/ 
files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf. 
 3. Alert (IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01): Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Criti-
cal Infrastructure, ICS-CERT (Feb. 25, 2016), https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/ 
IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01. 
 4. Andy Greenberg, ‘Crash Override’: The Malware That Took Down a 
Power Grid, WIRED (June 12, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/crash-over 
ride-malware. Unlike BlackEnergy, Crash Override appears to have been spe-
cifically built to disrupt physical systems like power grids. 
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world’s economy as much as three trillion dollars by 2020.5 Con-
sumers are generally aware that data breaches put them at risk 
for identity theft and fraud, but hackers have also targeted hos-
pital computers with ransomware. Once a computer is infected, 
the ransomware locks hospital employees out of computers that 
hold vital information about patients—information that could 
literally be the difference between life and death—and demands 
payment to restore employees’ access to the systems.6 
Generally speaking, it is a scary time to be a business owner 
who relies on computers for any important aspect of a business. 
Former FBI Director Robert Mueller has been quoted as saying 
that the only two types of companies are “those that have been 
hacked and those that will be.”7 Between 2012 and 2013, data 
breach incidents increased by sixty-two percent.8 Studies have 
consistently shown an alarming rate of success for phishing at-
tacks through e-mail.9 Leaving abandoned flash drives around 
also remains a surprisingly effective way to infiltrate a computer 
network.10 A company’s network security is only as strong as its 
weakest link, and sometimes all it takes is one careless click. 
So what can be done to improve the level of cybersecurity 
measures that are deployed throughout society? Kosseff criti-
cizes many cybersecurity debates as being too focused on puni-
tive, instead of collaborative, measures to unite the public and 
 
 5. Danielle Gilmore & David Armillei, The Future Is Now: The First Wave 
of Cyber Insurance Litigation Commences, and the Groundwork Is Laid for the 
Coming Storm, in INSURANCE LAW 2016: TOP LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY 
STRATEGIES FOR THE UPCOMING YEAR 23, 24 (2016).  
 6. E.g., Danny Palmer, Ransomware Blamed for Cyber Attack Which 
Forced Hospitals To Cancel Operations and Shut Down Systems, ZDNET (Dec. 
5, 2016), http://www.zdnet.com/article/ransomware-blamed-for-cyber-attack 
-which-forced-hospitals-to-cancel-operations-and-shut-down-systems. 
 7. Roberta D. Anderson, Viruses, Trojans, and Spyware, Oh My! The Yel-
low Brick Road to Coverage in the Land of Internet Oz, 49 TORT TRIAL & INS. 
PRAC. L.J. 529, 531 (2014). 
 8. Gregory D. Podolak, Insurance for Cyber Risks: A Comprehensive Anal-
ysis of the Evolving Exposure, Today’s Litigation, and Tomorrow’s Challenges, 
33 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 369, 372 (2015) (noting as well that the average cost of 
a data breach in the United States over that time period was over seven million 
dollars). 
 9. E.g., Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Law Firm Cyber Insurance: 
‘We Don’t Insure Stupid’, L. PRAC. MAG., Mar./Apr. 2016, at 24, 25 (citing a 2015 
Verizon report finding that “23% of recipients open emails sent by scam-
mers/hackers, and 11% download attachments from phishing emails”). 
 10. See, e.g., Shaun Nichols, Half of People Plug in USB Drives They Find 
in the Parking Lot, REGISTER (Apr. 11, 2016), http://www.theregister.co.uk/ 
2016/04/11/half_plug_in_found_drives. 
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private sectors.11 The United States has been taking gradual 
steps towards the latter goal over the last several years. The Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) created the 
Cybersecurity Framework as a voluntary set of cybersecurity 
standards, pursuant to an executive order issued by President 
Obama.12 In December 2015, Congress enacted the Cybersecu-
rity Information Sharing Act (CISA) as part of the omnibus 
budget bill.13 CISA allows for more cooperation between the pri-
vate sector and the government on matters pertaining to cyber 
threat indicators.14 To this end, a working group of business 
leaders has encouraged the creation of a cyber incident data and 
analysis repository (CIDAR) which is expected to contain infor-
mation about cyberattacks and associated losses, as well as ex-
amining the viability of the market for cyberinsurance.15 
This Article focuses on the goal of improving risk assess-
ment and risk shifting through better information, to facilitate 
the expansion of the cyberinsurance market. Cyberinsurance 
coverage has become more widely available in recent years,16 
and has been described as a “new frontier” for the modern insur-
ance market.17 Done well, a cyberinsurance market could pro-
vide a fundamentally private market solution to some of the 
most pressing cybersecurity problems by urging the develop-
ment and adoption of new security protections.18 A poorly de-
 
 11. Jeff Kosseff, Positive Cybersecurity Law: Creating a Consistent and In-
centive-Based System, 19 CHAP. L. REV. 401, 418 (2016). 
 12. Exec. Order No. 13,636, 3 C.F.R. 217 (2014); Cybersecurity Framework, 
NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2017). 
 13. Russell Brandom, Congress Passes Controversial Cybersecurity Bill At-
tached to Omnibus Budget, VERGE (Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.theverge.com/ 
2015/12/18/10582446/congress-passes-cisa-surveillance-cybersecurity. 
 14. 6 U.S.C. §§ 1502–1504 (2012). 
 15. COMM’N ON ENHANCING NAT’L CYBERSECURITY, REPORT ON SECURING 
AND GROWING THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 19–20 (2016), https://www.nist.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/2016/12/02/cybersecurity-commission-report-final 
-post.pdf. 
 16. See Collin J. Hite, The Ever-Changing Scope of Insurance Law, in IN-
SURANCE LAW 2013: TOP LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY STRATEGIES FOR THE 
UPCOMING YEAR 5, 6 (2013).  
 17. Anderson, supra note 7, at 591–92. 
 18. Ranjan Pal et al., Improving Network Security via Cyber-Insurance: A 
Market Analysis, in ACM TRANSACTIONS ON PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF 
COMPUTER SYSTEMS 1, 1:1–2 (2015), http://www-scf.usc.edu/~rpal/ACMTR.pdf 
(“Proponents of cyber-insurance believe that cyber-insurance would lead to the 
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signed cyberinsurance market, on the other hand, could aggra-
vate existing failings, reward free riders, create moral hazards, 
and inadvertently limit the cyberinsurance market to market 
participants that are at greatest risk for cyberattacks. Govern-
ment oversight could prove beneficial for establishing a proactive 
and efficient cyberinsurance market that offers extensive and af-
fordable coverage. 
Podolak describes data breaches as “[c]yber [r]isk’s poster 
child.”19 As data breaches continue to make headlines, interest 
in shifting cyber risk through insurance will likely increase as 
well. In 2014, the cyberinsurance market brought in approxi-
mately one billion dollars in premiums.20 Still, reports estimate 
that only about one-third of U.S. companies carry cyberinsur-
ance policies.21 In the event of a data breach, the other two-
thirds often rely on third-party commercial general liability pol-
icies (CGL policies).22 Many CGL policies, however, have lan-
guage excluding losses of electronic data.23 As more claims are 
denied, this will likely increase levels of interest in specific poli-
cies for cyber threats.24 
Unfortunately, the financial fallout from data breaches is 
currently unpredictable, making the risk difficult to insure 
against.25 Insurers also currently lack the kind of comprehensive 
actuarial data that informs decisions for other types of loss cov-
ered by insurance.26 Some insurance companies may respond to 
this uncertainty by charging higher premiums, creating exclu-
sions, and capping coverage, but these approaches may limit the 
reach of the cyberinsurance market. If cyberinsurance is too ex-
pensive, that leaves policyholders with less money to spend to 
 
design of insurance contracts that would shift appropriate amounts of self-de-
fense liability to the clients, thereby making the cyberspace more robust.”). 
 19. Podolak, supra note 8, at 371. 
 20. Liam M. D. Bailey, Mitigating Moral Hazard in Cyber-Risk Insurance, 
3 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 1, 41 (2014). 
 21. Anderson, supra note 7, at 533 (citing a 2013 Ponemon Institute study 
finding that thirty-one percent of companies carried cybersecurity insurance). 
 22. Id. at 542. 
 23. See Bailey, supra note 20, at 1. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 4. 
 26. Where Cyber Insurance Underwriting Stands Today, INS. J. (June 12, 
2015), http://insurancejournal.com/news/national/2015/06/12/371591.htm. 
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improve their information security.27 The proposed CIDAR sys-
tem could contribute significantly to making cyberinsurance 
more economically feasible by centralizing essential information. 
In this Article, we have two overarching goals. First, we ex-
amine problems in the cyberinsurance market and suggest im-
provements. Second, in order to understand the legal risk at-
tendant to interpretations of insurance policies, we conduct an 
empirical study of the current state of the insurance market by 
analyzing litigation over insurance coverage for computer-re-
lated harms. By focusing on technology, risk-transfer methods, 
and insurance-coverage litigation, we provide a comprehensive 
overview and a set of achievable goals that can strengthen the 
market for cyberinsurance. 
In the first Part, we examine the threats, the potential re-
sponses, and the ultimate inadequacy of currently available 
methods of addressing cyber risk. In the second Part, we exam-
ine risk shifting and the foundations of insurance more gener-
ally, and also explore the use of potential analogies to workers’ 
compensation insurance and the National Flood Insurance Pro-
gram to inform the cyberinsurance debate. Additionally, we dis-
cuss the potential of alternative risk-transfer methods. In the 
third Part, we provide empirical analysis of litigation involving 
cyberinsurance coverage. Our empirical analysis is based on a 
lawsuit repository that we created—the Cyberinsurance Litiga-
tion Analytics Database (CLAD)—which focuses on legal dis-
putes over insurance coverage for largely intangible, computer-
enabled losses. 
In the fourth Part, we offer recommendations for moving for-
ward. First, we discuss how insurance policy coverage issues 
should be addressed in light of our empirical findings. Second, 
we urge cooperation between the government and private sector 
to create the CIDAR system, and take other actions as necessary 
to improve risk assessment. Third, we propose an alternative 
risk-transfer model for cyberinsurance that could supplement 
traditional insurance policies by using the mechanisms available 
in the financial markets for capitalization and risk shifting. 
Fourth, we discuss what the government can do to support the 
emerging cyberinsurance market. 
 
 27. Bailey, supra note 20, at 5. 
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Cybersecurity is a modern crisis that requires flexibility and 
creative problem solving. Bad cybersecurity practices can dis-
rupt economies and jeopardize national security. With the polit-
ical divisions in the United States growing more contentious, it 
is more important than ever to work across party lines to address 
the risk of cybersecurity disasters that could lead to blackouts, 
recessions, and diplomatic crises. A stable cyberinsurance mar-
ket could empower the private sector, and protect our national 
interests and economy. 
I.  CYBERSECURITY AND THE THREATS WE FACE   
The Internet has transformed society. It has become a new 
playground, a ubiquitous center of learning, the bustling heart 
of commerce, and a social center. Its relative anonymity has also 
made it a haven for criminals,28 in part because of how easy it is 
to disguise origins and preserve deniability. Its connection to 
sensitive targets has created a new battlefield for conflicts be-
tween nations.29 The actors that evade security controls include 
benevolent researchers, mischievous troublemakers, malicious 
criminals, and government agencies.30 
The National Research Council (NRC) has defined a 
cyberattack as “the use of deliberate actions—perhaps over an 
extended period of time—to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or 
destroy adversary computer systems or networks or the infor-
mation and/or programs resident in or transiting these systems 
or networks.”31 Cyberattacks can have physical effects as well, 
 
 28. Svetlana Radosavac et al., Using Insurance To Increase Internet Secu-
rity, in COMPILATION E-PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCOMM 2008 CONFERENCE & 
THE CO-LOCATED WORKSHOPS 43, 43 (2008). 
 29. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, TECHNOLOGY, 
POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERAT-
TACK CAPABILITIES 50 (William A. Owens et al. eds., 2009) (noting the appeal 
of cyberattacks for covert action) [hereinafter NRC REPORT]; accord Daniel Gar-
rie & Shane R. Reeves, An Unsatisfactory State of the Law: The Limited Options 
for a Corporation Dealing with Cyber Hostilities by State Actors, 37 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1827, 1834–35 (2016) (noting that cyber hostilities have affected Estonia, 
Georgia, Iran, and Ukraine over the last decade). 
 30. See Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Bugs in the Market: Creating a 
Legitimate, Transparent, and Vendor-Focused Market for Software Vulnerabil-
ities, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 783 (2016) (defining “security researchers” as “non-
malicious hackers” who look for flaws in software). 
 31. NRC REPORT, supra note 29, at 80. 
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like the Stuxnet worm that was discovered in 2010 and is cred-
ited with destroying hundreds of nuclear centrifuges in Iran.32 A 
German steel mill is also alleged to have suffered physical dam-
age due to a cyberattack in 2014.33 A power outage in Kiev, 
Ukraine, in December 2016 is thought to be the result of a mal-
ware package specifically designed to target industrial control 
systems.34 
Cybersecurity is the counter to cyberattacks. Kosseff de-
scribes cybersecurity as actions to “safeguard the confidentiality, 
integrity, and accessibility of data.”35 Cybersecurity is necessary 
for the private and public sectors. Virtually everyone, from cus-
tomers to private companies to the government, is aware of the 
existence of cybersecurity risks, though they may not be aware 
of their own exposure. The adoption of cybersecurity technology 
has been slow, but a study from 2013 indicated that corporate 
directors and general counsel ranked data security high as an 
issue of concern.36 Small companies are especially vulnerable, as 
many of them may lack the resources to focus on security.37 
Hackers are also noticing that law firms are a good target for 
information and money, and, like small businesses, often lack 
strong security.38 
Cybersecurity is practically defined by volatility, as the de-
fenders must constantly adapt to counter the attackers, who are 
constantly adapting to get around new defenses.39 Before the In-
 
 32. David Kushner, The Real Story of Stuxnet, IEEE SPECTRUM (Feb. 26, 
2013), https://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-story-of-stuxnet. 
 33. Podolak, supra note 8, at 396. 
 34. Kim Zetter, The Malware Used Against the Ukrainian Power Grid Is 
More Dangerous Than Anyone Thought, VICE (June 12, 2017), https:// 
motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/zmeyg8/ukraine-power-grid-malware 
-crashoverride-industroyer. 
 35. Kosseff, supra note 11, at 404. 
 36. Hite, supra note 16, at 1. 
 37. See Sarah E. Needleman, Cybercriminals Sniff Out Vulnerable Firms, 
WALL ST. J. (July 5, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702 
303933404577504790964060610. 
 38. Dan Zureich & William Graebe, Cybersecurity: The Continuing Evolu-
tion of Insurance and Ethics, 82 DEF. COUNS. J. 192, 192–93 (Apr. 2015). Indeed, 
this is becoming an ethical issue for attorneys, with recent changes to the model 
ethics rules emphasizing the lawyer ’s obligation to “make reasonable efforts to 
prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of ” client information. Sean 
Harrington, Cyber Insurance: What Minnesota Lawyers Need To Know, 72 
BENCH & B. MINN. 16, 18 (Nov. 2015). 
 39. See Anderson, supra note 7, at 532. 
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ternet and the emergence of the personal computer market, com-
puters were not really designed to interact with each other.40 As 
computers became more networked and powerful, their capabil-
ities grew exponentially, but the means to exploit them also 
grew.41 Because of interdependent security risks, a single ad-
verse cybersecurity event at one firm can have a cascade effect 
that harms other systems linked to the same network.42 The 
highly publicized cyberattack on the Target retail chain in 2013, 
for example, happened because the attackers were able to hack 
Target’s HVAC contractor and use that connection to get into 
Target’s systems and steal payment data.43 
Cybercrime has become a digital epidemic. Interpol consid-
ers there to be two types of cybercrime: advanced cybercrime and 
cyber-enabled crime. Advanced cybercrime is defined as attacks 
against hardware and software, while a cyber-enabled crime is a 
traditional crime perpetrated with the use of a computer.44 A 
ransomware attack, for example, would be an advanced cyber-
crime, as it would not exist without the computers that it affects. 
On the other hand, when hackers exploit vulnerabilities in a 
bank’s system to enable a massive theft, this is a cyber-enabled 
version of a bank robbery.45 
The Ponemon Institute’s 2016 Cost of Cyber Crime study ex-
amined 237 companies in six countries.46 Organizations in the 
United States had the highest average cybercrime costs at over 
seventeen million dollars.47 A study by the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies estimated annual global cybercrime 
 
 40. See Carol M. Hayes, Note, Content Discrimination on the Internet: Calls 
for Regulation of Net Neutrality, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 493, 498 (de-
scribing the function of protocols like the Internet Protocol). 
 41. See Gilmore & Armillei, supra note 5, at 24 (“In 2010, McAfee, a leading 
cybersecurity firm, discovered a new piece of malware every fifteen minutes; by 
2013, it uncovered a new instance of malware every second.”). 
 42. Bailey, supra note 20, at 9; Podolak, supra note 8, at 372. 
 43. Podolak, supra note 8, at 372. 
 44. Garrie & Reeves, supra note 29, at 1832. 
 45. E.g., J. Weston Phippen, How Did Thieves in Japan Steal $13 Million 
from Convenience-Store ATMs?, ATLANTIC (May 23, 2016), https://www.theat-
lantic.com/international/archive/2016/05/japan-atm-theft/483902 (noting that 
thieves in Japan were able to exploit ATM limits to withdraw nearly thirteen 
million dollars in two hours). 
 46. PONEMON INST., 2016 COST OF CYBER CRIME STUDY & THE RISK OF 
BUSINESS INNOVATION 1 (2016), https://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/file/ 
2016%20HPE%20CCC%20GLOBAL%20REPORT%20FINAL%203.pdf [herein-
after PONEMON, CYBER CRIME]. 
 47. Id. 
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costs at over $400 billion in 2014.48 Another Ponemon Institute 
study in 2016, which solely focused on data breaches, found that 
the average cost of a data breach in the United States was $221 
per record lost.49 The global mean cost per record was $158, with 
data breaches in the healthcare industry costing over twice that 
at $355 per record.50 That study also found that having an inci-
dent response team and using encryption extensively were asso-
ciated with lower per capita data-breach costs, while migrating 
a lot of the company’s business to the cloud was associated with 
a higher per capita cost.51 
A. THREATS 
Vulnerabilities are at the heart of cyber threats. Consider, 
for instance, a DDoS attack. Flooding a system with data contin-
ues to be an effective attack method because a system’s finite 
capacity for receiving and processing data makes it vulnerable. 
An attacker can therefore flood a target with data until the tar-
get crashes or is knocked off-line. Computer viruses likewise rely 
on vulnerabilities—specifically, flaws in code that allow an at-
tacker to exercise control over the infected machine. Attacks en-
abled by viruses are much more versatile than attacks that rely 
solely on data capacity limitations because viruses can affect al-
most any part of the system, and their impacts are often much 
subtler than a simple denial of access. 
The Ponemon Institute’s 2016 cybercrime study enumerated 
eight categories of cyberattacks: (1) malware; (2) phishing and 
social engineering; (3) web-based attacks; (4) malicious code; (5) 
botnets; (6) stolen devices; (7) denial of service; and (8) malicious 
insiders.52 The report noted that malware and malicious code at-
tacks are linked, and the study considers malware attacks to be 
malicious-code attacks when they “successfully infiltrate[] the 
organizations’ networks or enterprise systems.”53 Ninety-eight 
percent of the companies tracked in the 2016 Ponemon Institute 
cybercrime study experienced malware attacks, compared to 
 
 48. Zureich & Graebe, supra note 38, at 192. 
 49. PONEMON INST., 2016 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY: GLOBAL ANALYSIS 
5 (2016), https://app.clickdimensions.com/blob/softchoicecom-anjf0/files/ 
ponemon.pdf [hereinafter PONEMON, DATA BREACH]. 
 50. Id. at 10. 
 51. Id. at 14. 
 52. PONEMON, CYBER CRIME, supra note 46, at 8. 
 53. Id. 
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sixty-one percent who experienced malicious-code attacks.54 For 
our purposes, it is not necessary to distinguish between types of 
threats, though it is valuable to have a sense of their scope. 
The goals of attackers vary widely. Cyberattack methods 
can be used for goals including causing a nuisance, espionage, 
and the disruption of critical infrastructure. It is very hard to 
tell at first glance what sort of attacker is involved. In 1998, the 
Pentagon was beset with a series of cyberattacks that were ini-
tially thought to be the actions of foreign terrorists.55 In reality, 
the attackers were two teenagers from the United States and one 
teenager from Israel, likely acting more out of mischief than mal-
ice.56 In 2000, a rejected job applicant in Maroochy Shire, 
Queensland, Australia, hacked into the local sewage control sys-
tem and caused a raw sewage spill.57 Whether driven by curios-
ity, revenge, or a general desire for destruction, the potential for 
harm by attackers is expansive. 
Many attack methods, but not all, require an unwitting ac-
complice in the form of a computer operator who clicks on an in-
fected file, uses bad password practices, or inserts an infected 
USB drive.58 Human error can also be the whole cause of some-
thing like a data breach, even in the absence of a malicious at-
tacker, as in the case of Travelers Indemnity Company of Amer-
ica v. Portal Healthcare Solutions, LLC which will be discussed 
in greater depth in a later section.59 In the Portal case, the 
healthcare company’s employees stored patient records in such 
a way that a simple search for a patient’s name in Google allowed 
the searcher to access the patient’s medical records.60 The post-
ing was likely inadvertent, and the company was sued in a class 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Law and Economics of Soft-
ware Security, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 295 (2006). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Tony Smith, Hacker Jailed for Revenge Sewage Attacks, REGISTER (Oct. 
31, 2001), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/10/31/hacker_jailed_for_revenge_ 
sewage. 
 58. See, e.g., Cassandra Kirsch, The Grey Hat Hacker: Reconciling Cyber-
space Reality and the Law, 41 N. KY. L. REV. 383, 396 (2014) (describing an 
incident in which a cyber security official failed to use different passwords for 
his accounts, resulting in his company being hacked via an amateur SQL injec-
tion); Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 55, at 290 (noting that Trojan horses 
and social engineering techniques are effective because people are generally in-
clined towards trusting others). 
 59. 35 F. Supp. 3d 765 (E.D. Va. 2014). 
 60. Id. at 768. 
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action for negligence or gross negligence, among other claims.61 
To borrow a term sometimes used by frustrated technical sup-
port professionals, a lot of threats to computer networks are at 
least partially PEBKAC issues—problem exists between key-
board and chair.62 
B. RESPONDING TO THREATS 
Threat responses can be categorized into what we call the 
three Ds: defend, deter, de-escalate. Defending can include pas-
sive methods like antivirus software and firewalls, as well as 
more active methods like tracing an attack back to its source. 
The goal of deterrence is to decrease the likelihood that an ad-
versary will do something harmful. Currently, the criminal law 
is the primary approach used for deterrence,63 though it remains 
difficult to identify attackers with sufficient certainty to support 
a conviction.64 De-escalation is about the system’s ability to 
bounce back after an attack, also referred to as its resilience. 
Each of these areas offers opportunities for public-private 
partnerships. For example, the government could subsidize de-
fensive technologies. Additionally, more information sharing be-
tween the public and private sectors about threats can enhance 
everyone’s defenses. Deterrence via criminal prosecution is gen-
erally beyond the control of the private sector, though citizens 
have the ability to make their voices heard through their legis-
lators in the enactment of stronger laws. Government assistance 
during the aftermath of a cyberattack can improve resilience. 
Garrie and Reeves note that corporations tend to support gov-
ernment involvement in the context of cyber threats.65 Indeed, if 
an attack on a private company is the work of a foreign power, 
as many suspect of the attack on Sony Pictures in late 2014,66 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Darlene Storm, 90% of Security Incidents Trace Back to PEBKAC and 
ID10T Errors, COMPUTER WORLD (Apr. 15, 2015), https://www.computerworld 
.com/article/2910316/90-of-security-incidents-trace-back-to-pebkac-and-id10t 
-errors.html. 
 63. See Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to 
Cyberattacks: A Justification for the Use of Active Defenses Against States Who 
Neglect Their Duty To Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 71 (2009) (“Stringent crimi-
nal laws and vigorous law enforcement will deter cyberattacks.”). 
 64. NRC REPORT, supra note 29, at 40. 
 65. Garrie & Reeves, supra note 29, at 1830. 
 66. See id. at 1829 (“[T]he United States publicly attributed both the hack-
ing and the threats to North Korea.”). 
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relying on the government may be their only recourse.67 Another 
way that the government can support private resilience efforts 
is through the promulgation of voluntary standards, like the Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology’s Cybersecurity 
Framework, by government agencies working with experts who 
are very knowledgeable about how to recover from adverse cyber 
events.68 
1. Defend 
Computer and network owners and operators have a lot of 
options for reducing their threat exposure, though Bailey notes 
that security investments have a diminishing rate of return.69 
Personal computer users typically have antivirus software, ei-
ther as a standalone product or as part of their operating sys-
tem.70 Sensitive information can be encrypted, and traffic com-
ing into the system can be automatically monitored with a 
firewall.71 More technologically savvy users might set up virtual 
machines to keep potential threats isolated in what is essentially 
“a fake computer running inside [their] real computer.”72 
Good computer-security hygiene is another essential ele-
ment of defense. Among other things, important files and sys-
tems should be backed up, users should be trained to avoid risks, 
and users should use good password practices.73 As noted above, 
user error is a constant threat to computer security. 
In a perfect world, everyone would use antivirus software 
and firewalls, encrypt sensitive information, and practice good 
computer-security hygiene. Moreover, in a perfect world, all of 
these things would be enough to avoid cyberattacks. Sklerov 
 
 67. Id. at 1846. 
 68. See infra notes 152–54 and accompanying text. See generally NAT’L 
INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRA-
STRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY 1 (2014), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf. 
 69. Bailey, supra note 20, at 8. 
 70. AV COMPS., IT SECURITY SURVEY 2014 8 (2014), https://www.av 
-comparatives.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/security_survey2014_en.pdf. 
 71. See Neal Katyal, Community Self-Help, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 33, 43 
(2005) (discussing encryption and firewalls as ways for users to eliminate 
“harms from crime”). 
 72. Micah Lee, With Virtual Machines, Getting Hacked Doesn’t Have To Be 
That Bad, INTERCEPT (Sept. 16, 2015), https://theintercept.com/2015/09/16/ 
getting-hacked-doesnt-bad. 
 73. See Sklerov, supra note 63, at 23–24 (discussing security administra-
tion as an element of cybersecurity). 
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points out that there are frequently design flaws in computer 
software that create security vulnerabilities.74 These vulnerabil-
ities in code are continually being discovered, and most defensive 
software cannot block code that exploits vulnerabilities un-
known to the software’s creators.75 Such vulnerabilities are 
called zero-day vulnerabilities, and their scarcity makes them 
very valuable.76 It is generally unlikely that an exploit that tar-
gets a large number of systems would rely on a zero-day vulner-
ability, but such exploits are the perfect example of why even the 
best defensive practices may ultimately be inadequate.77 This is 
also a reason why recent cybersecurity innovations have focused 
more on recognizing behavioral outliers than on known virus sig-
natures.78 
2. Deter 
During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence relied on the prom-
ise of mutually assured destruction.79 Deterrence may be based 
on the threat of punishment or the denial of success.80 Criminal 
prosecution is the clearest example of deterrence by punishment. 
Unfortunately, that requires accurate attribution of the attack, 
which is often very difficult with cyberattacks.81 Additionally, it 
is often unclear the extent to which increased punishment actu-
ally enhances deterrence.82 A report by the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission in 1996 cites research that criminalizing a behavior 
increases deterrence when there is a perception of “certain, swift 
 
 74. Id. at 26. 
 75. See LILLIAN ABLON & ANDY BOGART, RAND CORP., ZERO DAYS, THOU-
SANDS OF NIGHTS: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ZERO-DAY VULNERABILITIES AND 
THEIR EXPLOITS at iii n.1 (2017). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Roger Park, Guide to Zero-Day Exploits, SYMANTEC CONNECT: BLOG 
(Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/guide-zero-day-exploits. 
 78. See, e.g., The Enterprise Immune System, DARKTRACE, https://www 
.darktrace.com/technology (summarizing the company’s approach to cyber 
threats as emphasizing machine learning and an “enterprise immune system”) 
(last visited Oct. 6, 2017). 
 79. Graham H. Todd, Armed Attack in Cyberspace: Deterring Asymmetric 
Warfare with an Asymmetric Definition, 64 A.F. L. REV. 65, 97 (2009). 
 80. NRC REPORT, supra note 29, at 40. 
 81. Id. at 41. 
 82. U.S. SENTENCING COMM., REPORT TO CONGRESS: ADEQUACY OF FED-
ERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINE PENALTIES FOR COMPUTER FRAUD AND VANDAL-
ISM OFFENSES 9 (1996), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/con-
gressional-testimony-and-reports/computer-crime/199606_RtC_Computer_ 
Fraud_and_Vandalism_Offenses.pdf. 
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and severe” punishment.83 If punishment is perceived to be lack-
ing in any one of these areas, “the deterrent effect diminishes.”84 
Some research even suggests that harsh penalties may actually 
exacerbate computer crime.85 
The credible threat of in-kind counterstrikes may also have 
a punishment-derived deterrent effect,86 but experts suggest 
that this approach may have limited applicability.87 A core rea-
son for this is that accurate attribution still remains elusive, and 
attackers will not feel deterred if they are confident in their an-
onymity.88 Additionally, the legality of cybercounterstrikes is 
currently questionable at best. In 2008, a group of security re-
searchers figured out how to dismantle a very large botnet, but 
they decided against acting on this knowledge out of concerns 
about legal liability.89 
Under current conditions, therefore, deterrence by punish-
ment seems inadequate. Similarly, deterrence by denial comes 
up short on credibility, especially for targets in the private sec-
tor.90 With an ever-growing number of targets and vulnerabili-
ties, defenders have to be prepared to defend everywhere against 
attackers who can strike anywhere.91 If the attacker is denied 
success by one target, the attacker can just try a different attack 
method or a different target. 
Future work should be done to explore how to credibly deter 
cyberattacks. For now, unfortunately, there does not seem to be 
an easy way forward to actually reduce the number of attempted 
attacks. 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Reid Skibell, Cybercrimes & Misdemeanors: A Reevaluation of the Com-
puter Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 909, 938 (2003). 
 86. Sklerov, supra note 63, at 10. 
 87. NRC REPORT, supra note 29, at 5. 
 88. Id. at 41. Attribution efforts have improved over the last eight years 
since the NRC report was published, but accurate identification of aggressors 
remains a significant stumbling block. 
 89. T. Luis de Guzman, Unleashing a Cure for the Botnet Zombie Plague: 
Cybertorts, Counterstrikes, and Privileges, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 527, 527–28 
(2010); Gregg Keizer, Researchers Infiltrate Kraken Botnet, Could Clean It Out, 
PCWORLD (Apr. 30, 2008), http://www.pcworld.com/article/145345/article.html; 
cf. Garrie & Reeves, supra note 29, at 1858–59 (“Active defense also opens the 
door for disproportionate retaliatory attacks that can cause collateral damage 
to innocent parties, especially when it is not clear who the target is.”). 
 90. NRC REPORT, supra note 29, at 305. 
 91. Katyal, supra note 71, at 60. 
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3. De-escalate 
After a cyberattack, victims switch to restoring their sys-
tems back to a pre-attack state. Costs of this stage include the 
costs of repairing systems and restoring data, among other 
things.92 This stage also involves investigations, which can in-
form the victim’s future security practices.93 After a data breach, 
costs may include notifying affected parties and providing those 
parties with subscriptions to credit monitoring services.94 
The Cybersecurity Framework created by NIST is divided 
into five functions: identify, protect, detect, respond, and re-
cover.95 De-escalation, or resilience, is centered in the fifth func-
tion, recovery.96 The recover function in the Framework includes 
recommendations about recovery planning and how to imple-
ment and manage recovery plans.97 Through the Cybersecurity 
Framework, the government has provided the private sector 
with centralized information about recovery practices as recom-
mended by experts, mitigating some of the uncertainty facing 
business owners.98 
Specific cyberinsurance policies are often drafted to cover 
the above described types of crisis management activities.99 We 
consider insurance to be an element of de-escalation that is ac-
quired prior to an event. Insurance coverage for cyberattacks of-
ten works alongside defensive measures, as insurers are likely 
 
 92. See Henry Bodkin et al., Government Under Pressure After NHS Crip-
pled in Global Cyber Attack as Weekend of Chaos Looms, TELEGRAPH (May 13, 
2017), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/12/nhs-hit-major-cyber-attack 
-hackers-demanding-ransom. 
 93. See id. 
 94. The True Cost of Data Breaches for Businesses, Consumers & the Pay-
ment Industry, FIELD NATION (June 1, 2015), https://www.fieldnation.com/blog/ 
the-true-cost-of-data-breaches-for-businesses-consumers-the-payment 
-industry. 
 95. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 68, at 7. 
 96. Id. at 9. 
 97. Id. 
 98. The recover function is further divided into three categories: (1) recov-
ery planning; (2) improvements; and (3) communications. In short, it empha-
sizes the importance of having plans for recovering from events, improving 
those plans as changes are needed, and communicating with others about re-
covery activities. Id. at 34–35. 
 99. Anderson, supra note 7, at 604–05. 
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to demand that policyholders observe industry standards for se-
curity.100 Some insurance companies also work with policyhold-
ers by providing fraud-prevention technologies or connecting the 
policyholders with security auditors.101 
C. EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The United States does not currently have a comprehensive 
cybersecurity law.102 Instead, there is a patchwork of fixes scat-
tered throughout different levels of government.103 Information 
technology regulation in the United States tends to err on the 
side of less regulation, but is this sustainable? Recently, leading 
cybersecurity expert Bruce Schneier testified before Congress 
that the newer threats to cybersecurity require government in-
tervention due to market failure.104 
The issue of whether and how to regulate cybersecurity 
evokes Kant’s paradox of freedom. In an environment where 
there is no law, everyone is free—but in the absence of law, the 
strong control the weak, so the weak are not truly free.105 The 
strong in cybersecurity are those in control of the production and 
distribution of insecure products, while the weak are those 
whose interests are harmed by the lack of emphasis on cyberse-
curity. This power imbalance could theoretically be corrected by 
the market, but this poses a separate challenge. If the market 
for computer products emphasized security as much as it empha-
sizes other features, there would be more demand for secure 
products. Instead, consumers are often ill-informed about secu-
rity issues.106 Unlike a set of features that can improve a user’s 
 
 100. Podolak, supra note 8, at 406–07 (noting, however, that industry stand-
ard security practices may still be inadequate or negligent). 
 101. Anna Lee, Why Traditional Insurance Policies Are Not Enough: The Na-
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 102. Kosseff, supra note 11, at 401. 
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 106. See Michael Thornton, You Can’t Depend on Antivirus Software Any-
more, SLATE (Feb. 16, 2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_ 
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experience in an observable way, security is something that is 
only easily observable when it fails. More security testing before 
release would likely lead to higher prices for consumers, and it 
may prove challenging to convince consumers to pay more for an 
improvement that they cannot see. 
One solution is to introduce regulations to induce the more 
powerful to act for the benefit of the less powerful, but again the 
paradox of freedom arises: the more laws there are governing 
how people act, the less free people become.107 Cybersecurity is 
increasingly vital to society, so this balancing act across various 
economic actors will likely be ongoing. 
1. Statutes 
Statutory approaches to computer security issues are 
largely a patchwork process, with new provisions being added as 
needed to address specific problems. The current statutory ap-
proach to cybersecurity in the United States is largely backward-
looking, and this, combined with its patchwork nature, makes it 
difficult to address future issues.108 
One problem that statutes address to varying degrees is 
data breaches. Most states have laws about data breaches that 
address how companies should behave following a breach, but 
these are typically narrow and punitive rules.109 Some states 
have additional data-privacy legislation. In California, for in-
stance, the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act prohibits retailers 
from requiring customers to disclose personal identification in-
formation as a condition of accepting a credit card.110 
There is no federal data-breach law yet, which creates con-
siderable confusion for companies that may have to take differ-
ent actions for customers in different states because of differing 
state data breach laws.111 However, there are federal laws ad-
dressing specific data-privacy concerns, like the Children’s 
Online Privacy Protection Act, the Video Privacy Protection Act, 
and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
 
 107. Id. at 117. 
 108. Kosseff, supra note 11, at 406. 
 109. Id. at 401–02. 
 110. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08(a)(2) (West 2011). 
 111. See Kosseff, supra note 11, at 406 (“Accordingly, if a company experi-
ences a data breach, it must devote significant time and staff to determining the 
states in which it must notify residents and regulators as well as the timing, 
form, and substance of the notification.”). 
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(HIPAA), which all focus on the protection of data in narrow cat-
egories.112 
There are also federal laws that focus on criminal liability 
or procedural issues. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act is a 
federal law that prohibits a range of computer-based activities 
with varying subversive effects, but it does not address things 
like security standards or liability for anyone other than the at-
tacker.113 Congress made identity theft a federal crime with the 
Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, which 
criminalizes the act of producing, transferring, and possessing 
another’s identification documents without authorization.114 
In terms of investigatory schemes, Congress enacted the 
Stored Communications Act (SCA) in the 1980s. This statute in-
cludes provisions about how stored data can be disclosed to the 
government, either through voluntary or compelled processes.115 
Because its language has not been significantly updated, the 
SCA makes some very outdated distinctions between “electronic 
communication services” and “remote computing services.”116 
Several commentators have urged amending the SCA and its 
parent statute, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA).117 Courts have also been tasked with evaluating the 
Fourth Amendment and how it applies to digital evidence; some 
of these analyses overlap with the SCA’s provisions about com-
pelled disclosure.118 
 
 112. Patrick P. Gunn et al., The Health Insurance Portability and Accounta-
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 118. E.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (holding that a cell 
phone’s contents could not be searched without a warrant as part of a search 
incident to arrest); United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427–28 (4th Cir. 
 210 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:191 
 
There are many challenges with applying existing law to 
emerging cybersecurity problems, though that is outside the 
scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that the current statutory 
regime is woefully inadequate for addressing modern threats. At 
a minimum, Congress needs to enact federal data-breach legis-
lation to address some of the economic uncertainty of cybersecu-
rity risks. 
2. Litigation 
In the absence of clear ex ante guidelines, courts are increas-
ingly being asked to evaluate liability issues following cyberse-
curity events. The 2013 breach of the retail giant Target was met 
with over 140 lawsuits.119 Some of the claims against Target al-
leged harm caused by the company’s violation of state data 
breach notification laws.120 Not only are a lot of suits being filed, 
they are also being filed very quickly. For example, within two 
weeks of the discovery of Home Depot’s data breach in Septem-
ber 2014,121 consumers and financial institutions had already 
filed suits in federal courts.122 
Though it remains difficult to identify with certainty the 
parties responsible for cyberattacks, civil lawsuits provide an av-
enue of redress against those who failed to safeguard data. One 
option under the common law is negligence, though the duty of 
care required for data protection is far from clear.123 Many data-
breach plaintiffs assert claims based on violations of common 
law and statutes. In Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance 
Co., plaintiffs alleged invasion of privacy and negligence, com-
mon-law claims, and also argued that the company’s behavior 
amounted to a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
 
2016) (holding that historical cell site location data can be obtained from a mo-
bile service provider using a special order under the SCA instead of a warrant). 
 119. Podolak, supra note 8, at 376. 
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(FCRA).124 In a case involving data stolen from a government 
contractor, plaintiffs alleged violations of both the federal Pri-
vacy Act and FCRA, in addition to common-law claims for negli-
gence and breach of contract, among others.125 In some cases, the 
Uniform Commercial Code may come into play when evaluating 
whether the businesses’ security practices were commercially 
reasonable.126 
There have been several stumbling blocks for data-breach 
litigation. We will highlight two of these: the scope of data-
breach statutes, and standing. As noted above, most states al-
ready have their own data-breach notification laws. The effec-
tiveness of these laws for supporting data-breach litigation, how-
ever, varies. In Illinois, for example, the Personal Information 
Protection Act requires notification after a breach, and also 
states that a violation under the Act is also an unlawful practice 
covered by the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business 
Practices Act.127 However, in Cooney v. Chicago Public Schools, 
a state appellate court found no violation of the data breach no-
tification law because the law only created a duty to notify af-
fected parties, not a duty to safeguard information.128 Moreover, 
the Cooney court held that the state Consumer Fraud Act did not 
apply because the increased risk of identity theft did not consti-
tute an economic injury.129 
The actionability of increased risk of identity theft under 
state law is also related to the second major stumbling block: Ar-
ticle III standing. In 2013, the Supreme Court decided Clapper 
v. Amnesty International to clarify the doctrine of Article III 
standing for future harms.130 In Clapper, the Court was asked to 
decide if Amnesty International had standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of warrantless surveillance under section 702 
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.131 The Court con-
cluded that the organization had no standing because the feared 
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future warrantless interception was not “certainly impend-
ing.”132 The requirement that allegations of future harm must be 
certainly impending is problematic for digital privacy injuries. 
Following Clapper, several district courts declined to find stand-
ing in data-breach cases where the asserted injury was an in-
creased risk of identity theft.133 
Other courts have reached the opposite conclusion. In Rem-
ijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, the Seventh Circuit concluded 
that plaintiffs had standing due to the substantial risk of future 
injury following a data breach.134 In Remijas, the Seventh Cir-
cuit noted that in Clapper, the standing issue was based on un-
certainty over whether surveillance had taken place.135 In other 
words, the data collection itself was speculative. The data breach 
at issue in Remijas, on the other hand, was not speculative. 
There had been a data breach and third parties had improperly 
gained access to sensitive customer information.136 The Seventh 
Circuit thus concluded that it was plausible to infer a substantial 
risk of harm stemming from the data breach sufficient to find 
Article III standing.137 In September 2016, the Sixth Circuit 
joined the Seventh Circuit in this reasoning, when it reversed a 
district court’s conclusion that data breach plaintiffs lacked 
standing in the Galaria case.138 
Remijas and Galaria both represent a willingness by federal 
appellate courts to conclude that data-breach victims have 
standing. If other jurisdictions follow suit, that may remove one 
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of the early road blocks encountered by data-breach litigants, en-
abling more cases to be decided on the merits. More decisions on 
the merits in data-breach cases will, in turn, increase the need 
for risk shifting to minimize losses, and increase participation in 
the cyberinsurance marketplace. 
3. Administrative Actions 
Administrative agencies have also been involved to varying 
degrees. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), for in-
stance, has issued guidance documents about cybersecurity be-
cause of the impact that security events can have on stock 
prices.139 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) operates 
the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 
Center to coordinate responses with the private and government 
sectors.140 DHS also operates the Office of Cybersecurity and 
Communications to focus on critical information infrastruc-
ture.141 The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
has released guidance on the interplay between the NIST’s Cy-
bersecurity Framework and the HIPAA Security Rule.142 
So far, however, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has 
arguably been the most active agency in the data-security arena. 
The FTC has brought actions against companies with inade-
quate security practices under its authority to investigate unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices.143 Section 5 of the FTC Act gives 
the FTC the authority to declare business practices to be unfair, 
and thus unlawful, if the practices cause “substantial injury” to 
consumers.144 Many FTC actions end in settlements or consent 
decrees.145 For example, in August 2014, the FTC settled charges 
against Fandango and Credit Karma regarding the companies’ 
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failures to adequately secure sensitive information that custom-
ers submitted through their mobile applications.146 
In 2015, the Third Circuit affirmed the FTC’s authority in 
FTC v. Wyndham, concluding that the FTC may rightly consider 
a cybersecurity practice unfair when that practice has resulted 
in harm to consumers.147 Past consent decrees indicate that un-
fair cybersecurity practices include not protecting against “com-
monly known or reasonably foreseeable attacks,” not encrypting 
data, not using an intrusion-detection system, and not providing 
cybersecurity training to employees.148 
This characterization of the FTC’s authority, however, is in-
herently backward looking. The FTC and the Third Circuit both 
acknowledge that the FTC lacks the authority to require the 
adoption of “fair information practice policies.”149 Section 5 also 
addresses unfair practices that are “likely to cause” substantial 
injury,150 but, so far, the FTC has not attempted to assert pre-
scriptive authority to establish specific cybersecurity standards. 
Unfair cybersecurity practices have thus largely been in the 
realm of “I know it when I see it,” with the FTC providing little, 
if any, concrete guidance for what makes data security practices 
adequate.151 
A more forward-looking approach to security can be seen in 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
which published the Cybersecurity Framework in response to 
President Obama’s Executive Order 13,636.152 The Cybersecu-
rity Framework is a voluntary, performance-based standard that 
is directed at increasing the security of critical infrastructure, 
though it can be useful for other industries as well.153 The Cy-
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bersecurity Framework centralizes information about best prac-
tices and is a helpful guide for businesses that want to make sure 
that they are doing all that they can to reduce their risk.154 
4. International Law 
International cyber conflicts are beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle, but we offer a brief introduction to the issues to support an 
awareness of the massive scope of cybersecurity problems. 
Cybercrime complicates the application of laws. Because cy-
bercrime passes through national borders frequently, jurisdic-
tional issues can be contentious.155 The European Convention on 
Cybercrime (ECC) is a treaty that aims to address this difficulty 
by standardizing cybercrime laws and encouraging cooperation 
between nations.156 However, treaties are only enforceable 
against countries that sign them, and to date, only fifty-nine 
countries have signed the ECC.157 Of some of the more cyber-
active countries, the United States and Israel have ratified the 
ECC, but Russia and China have not.158 
Cyberspace conflicts between nation states introduce a lot of 
new problems. While the ECC is potentially useful when a pri-
vate citizen of one country hacks a private citizen of another 
country, things get much messier when the victim or attacker is 
a nation state.159 At that point, the United Nations Charter and 
the laws of war start to apply. There are two aspects of the law 
of war: jus ad bellum, which is the law of conflict management and 
applies prior to a conflict, and jus in bello, which is the law of 
armed conflict and applies during a conflict.160 
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The UN charter is primarily concerned with jus ad bellum and 
the rules governing state relations prior to war. The UN charter 
prohibits use of force by states, with an exception for self-defense 
in response to an armed attack.161 The Caroline standard for 
self-defense under international law focuses on whether the re-
sponse was necessary and proportionate.162 But when dealing 
with cyberweapons instead of kinetic weapons, it is unclear what 
constitutes a use of force or an armed attack. This and other am-
biguities led to the creation of the Tallinn Manual by a group of 
experts working with NATO.163 The Tallinn Manual is non-bind-
ing, but it does provide some guidance for how traditional ap-
proaches to conflict might apply to cyber conflict.164 
D. NEED FOR A NEW, COMPREHENSIVE MODEL 
Cybersecurity is a crisis of our time. The threats are growing 
faster than the defenses, and the technology is evolving faster 
than the law.165 It is difficult to catch the actual bad actors, so 
courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies are left weigh-
ing liability issues for the database operators who are often vic-
tims themselves. Courts are often being asked to consider data 
breaches and similar events through a negligence framework, 
but the threats may evolve too quickly for defendants to know 
what they should be doing to act within their duty of care.166 Cit-
ron suggests that strict liability could be a more effective frame-
work than negligence,167 but this has not yet been tested effec-
tively. 
Too many of the efforts to address today’s cybersecurity con-
cerns are backward-looking. In principle, the reasoning resem-
bles the res ipsa loquitur doctrine of negligence: the fact that the 
event happened at all indicates that the protections were inade-
quate.168 The analysis then attempts to identify which weak-
nesses in cyberprotection may have enabled a successful attack. 
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Policymakers should avoid relying on this kind of ex post analy-
sis. 
Cybersecurity, though, is a conceptually tricky area. It is 
easy to see when cybersecurity practices are bad, but if the prac-
tices are good, they are invisible. This is one of the reasons why 
NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework is important. Establishing 
standards of conduct before a crisis can mitigate the worst of an 
event. 
There are other regulatory alternatives as well. Kosseff sug-
gests that Congress could enact a law directing the FTC to de-
velop a safe harbor program for cybersecurity that would par-
tially protect compliant companies from lawsuits or regulatory 
action.169 Kosseff also suggests tax incentives for cybersecurity 
practices170 and the creation of a national cybersecurity insur-
ance system.171 
The degree of government involvement needed in the cyber-
insurance market is an open question. Insurance companies are 
increasingly offering insurance coverage for cyber events, but 
this coverage is not yet fully developed as an insurance prod-
uct.172 Government support in this arena can help insurance 
companies and policyholders adapt to the changing market. This 
is also not without precedent. Congress created the National 
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) to improve the ability of prop-
erty owners to obtain flood insurance.173 NFIP uses an incentive 
model of legislation that is largely voluntary, but that provides 
benefits to states for participation.174 
Cybersecurity policy requires cooperation between the gov-
ernment and the private sector. Insurance is a private-market 
solution to the problem of unavoidable risk. In the following 
Part, we will explore issues of insurance and risk shifting more 
fully, and the respective roles available to the government and 
various private-sector actors. 
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II.  RISK SHIFTING   
Risk can be defined as the probability of an adverse occur-
rence times the severity of the consequences if it occurs.175 Many 
desirable activities are nonetheless plagued by risk. Insurance 
policies allow individuals to hedge against adverse events with-
out abandoning risky pursuits and their possible rewards. There 
are four ways to manage risk: (1) risk mitigation; (2) risk avoid-
ance; (3) risk acceptance; and (4) risk transfer.176 Nobel Prize–
winning economist Kenneth Arrow notes that if individuals are 
unable to buy protection against uncertainty, a loss of welfare 
can result.177 
This Article is most concerned with the practice of transfer-
ring risks, especially in the context of cybersecurity. However, 
reduced risk is often accompanied by a moral hazard, because 
people may act carelessly when they do not bear the risk of fail-
ure.178 People may also fail to prepare for risks because they un-
derestimate the likelihood of an adverse event.179 One version of 
this is the gambler’s fallacy, where people begin to think that 
something is more likely simply because it has happened in the 
past.180 If someone flips a coin nine times, and the coin comes up 
heads each time, the chance of the coin coming up heads on the 
tenth coin flip is still fifty percent. The gambler’s fallacy would 
make someone erroneously conclude that the chance of a head or 
tail flip is something other than fifty percent. 
This Part will primarily focus on insurance, which is the 
main device used for the transfer of risk. There are two key prob-
lems with the cyberinsurance industry as it exists today. First, 
informational asymmetry is rampant, because insurers do not 
have a guaranteed way to evaluate a potential client’s cyber risk, 
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so insurers charge higher premiums to cover their own uncer-
tainty.181 When premiums increase, an adverse selection prob-
lem emerges, where those with high cyber risk continue purchas-
ing insurance while those with low risk instead focus on self-
insurance.182 This is the well-known lemons market problem, 
where only one party has full information about whether a prod-
uct is a good or bad investment, leading to a distribution of qual-
ity in the market that is skewed towards lower-quality prod-
ucts.183 For cybersecurity insurance, the informational 
asymmetry generally favors the policyholder who knows their 
systems to a greater degree than is possible for the insurer. If 
premiums are too high, only firms at greatest risk might seek 
insurance. On the other hand, if premiums are too low, the in-
surer may be subsidizing harmful behavior.184 Currently, insur-
ance companies use long and arduous surveys to evaluate poten-
tial clients’ cyber-risk exposure, but this approach still relies on 
self-reporting. 
The second key problem is data scarcity, in that there is not 
currently enough information about cyber risks in general.185 
This ties in to the informational asymmetry problem, because a 
lack of information about risks makes it more difficult for insur-
ers to conduct accurate risk assessments.186 There will be 
greater uncertainty and informational asymmetry if policyhold-
ers fail to disclose their own cyber risks related to their own IT 
infrastructure. This makes it difficult to systematically assess 
cybersecurity risk in various market sectors. Finally, there is 
global uncertainty about the scope of cyber risks.187 
We note, however, that there is also an increasing interest 
in alternative risk transfer (ART) techniques.188 Insurers often 
work with banks in this arena, such as when derivatives are 
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used as part of risk management.189 ART markets have a lot of 
potential, especially in emerging risk classes.190 Ultimately, 
ART techniques could potentially address cybersecurity risks in 
a way that traditional insurance policies cannot. 
A. THE ECONOMICS OF RISK 
Decision makers weigh a variety of costs when deciding a 
course of action. Economists refer to some costs as externalities 
when these costs affect external conditions more than they affect 
decision makers.191 Because of the lack of immediate effect, ex-
ternalities are often not given as much consideration as other 
costs.192 For example, a factory owner has to determine how to 
dispose of waste from production activities, and they decide that 
the easiest disposal method is to dump the waste in a nearby 
river. The factory owner does not experience the downstream ef-
fects of this dumping, so the decision is economically appealing. 
Government regulations motivate decision makers to internalize 
these externalities.193 If the cost of responsible disposal is less 
than the factory owner could expect to pay in noncompliance 
fines, the factory owner will probably comply until the disposal 
costs go up or the fines go down. 
The problem of externalities is one reason why legal regimes 
may apply liability rules. In his seminal work, The Costs of Acci-
dents, Calabresi argued that tort liability should generally at-
tach to the lowest-cost avoider—that is, the party that can most 
cheaply avoid the accident.194 In the data-breach context, this 
will generally be the database operator whose security controls 
are compromised.195 By imposing liability on database operators 
for events like data breaches, the court system is edging network 
operators closer to the internalization of externalities. 
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Unlimited liability, however, could potentially stifle innova-
tion.196 This is where the risk-shifting function of insurance be-
comes more valuable. The goal of cybersecurity insurance should 
be to encourage policyholders to continue to internalize the 
larger societal costs of inadequate cybersecurity while reducing 
the risk of open-ended liability.197 
Externalities are pervasive in cybersecurity, because the 
larger social costs of insecurity are often not borne by network 
operators.198 Security is also costly, and many organizations 
would arguably prefer to focus on activities that generate 
profit.199 With finite resources, therefore, a company that makes 
an Internet-connected device might prefer to invest in making 
the device cheaply over making the device with security in mind. 
One possibility that has been raised by economists is to sub-
sidize security investments.200 Another proposal involves creat-
ing a new role for internet service providers (ISPs) as providers 
of insurance against cyber risk.201 These kinds of interventions 
would mitigate some of the externality problems. In this Article, 
we are primarily concerned with the traditional model of insur-
ance that uses a dedicated insurance company to help clients 
manage risks. Ultimately, insurance policies provide an eco-
nomic tool for managing risks, and our concern is about how the 
lessons of the industry can be applied to improve cybersecurity. 
B. INSURANCE 
At its core, the insurance industry is about shifting risks 
from those with less ability to pay to those with more ability to 
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pay, enabling those who might have been hobbled by risks to 
take actions to benefit both themselves and society. The insur-
ance industry accepts premiums from policyholders, and in re-
turn, the policyholders get peace of mind.202 In the absence of 
insurance, a small business owner could potentially be driven 
out of business by a slip-and-fall accident that occurred on their 
premises. Insurance companies effectively pool risk and distrib-
ute that risk among all of the members of the pool.203 
People routinely purchase insurance policies to protect 
themselves against accidents or other adverse events. Insurance 
coverage is often socially desirable, and in some situations, in-
surance is mandatory. Mortgage lenders frequently require bor-
rowers to have home insurance.204 Almost every state requires 
drivers to carry insurance on their vehicles. In the case of auto 
insurance, making sure that drivers have insurance coverage 
helps to ensure that if a driver causes harm to persons or prop-
erty, that harm can be redressed. 
Insurers have several options for protecting their profitabil-
ity. By diversifying their risk portfolios, for instance, they can 
reduce the likelihood of having more claims than they can pay.205 
Insurance companies also frequently require policyholders to use 
risk-reduction strategies.206 For example, insurance companies 
can raise and lower premiums in response to the policyholder’s 
actions, offsetting the moral hazard problem.207 A driver who has 
a car accident may find that their insurance premiums increase 
significantly. Insurance companies can also offset their risks by 
participating in the reinsurance market.208 Reinsurance is basi-
cally insurance for insurers.209 
Another way that insurance companies protect their invest-
ments is by pooling and sharing loss data with other insurance 
companies.210 In other industries, this kind of cooperation would 
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raise red flags for possible antitrust violations, but the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act carves out exceptions for the insurance indus-
try.211 
There are a lot of decisions to be made when shaping an in-
surance policy. The Insurance Services Office (ISO) is a private 
entity that is largely responsible for developing the language of 
policy forms.212 Insurers also need to decide how they will deter-
mine premiums, such as whether the premium is based on the 
industry or whether the premium is determined retrospectively, 
based on the client’s claims from the previous year.213 A policy 
may also be based on claims made, or it may be based on occur-
rences. A claims-made policy covers claims that are reported 
during the policy period, while an occurrence policy covers inci-
dents that occur during the policy period without regard to when 
the claim is filed.214 
One frequent concern for insurance companies is the prob-
lem of correlated risks. A lot of risks are uncorrelated, like the 
likelihood that two specific people will be in a traffic accident on 
the same day.215 If a risk is correlated, that means that a large 
number of claims are likely to arise from the same harmful 
event.216 Hurricanes are a classic example of a correlated risk. If 
a hurricane lands in a populated area, a lot of people are likely 
to file claims for property damage caused by high winds and 
floods.217 Scales notes that correlation leads to more variability 
in losses, and thus higher premiums.218 One of the challenges of 
the fledgling cyberinsurance market is that it is not always clear 
whether cyber-event losses are correlated or uncorrelated. If a 
virus is disseminated through spam e-mail, the harms caused by 
that virus may be considered correlated. However, more targeted 
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attacks may be considered uncorrelated. The nature of cyber-
crime, unfortunately, can make it very difficult to distinguish be-
tween different types of attacks. 
Exclusions are a frequently litigated aspect of insurance pol-
icies. Scales cynically notes that insurers often seek to exclude 
coverage for accidents that are of the type that the policy was 
clearly intended to cover.219 Scales acknowledges that market 
segmentation may be part of the reason for this behavior.220 If a 
homeowner’s policy includes an exclusion for mold, the home-
owner has an incentive to purchase additional coverage for mold. 
Through market segmentation, the experiences of customers and 
companies can be more tailored to their respective needs. Some 
commentators have noted that insurance companies seem to be 
fighting claims more than they might have in the past, which 
may be related to broad concerns about the economy.221 We ob-
served in our research that exclusions are often central to con-
tested claims.222 
In addition to excluding certain causes of loss, insurers may 
also use exclusion language to limit coverage when the policy-
holder does not do enough to avoid a risk. An exclusion for a 
cyberinsurance policy might, for example, exclude coverage for 
events if the policyholder failed to keep their security software 
updated.223 
Anti-concurrent causation language may further complicate 
coverage. Such language basically says that excluded events are 
still excluded from coverage even when they are not the sole 
cause of a loss.224 Some insurers have attempted to use anti-con-
current causation language to also exclude covered causes if an 
excluded cause contributed to a loss.225 Consider a correlated 
risk like a hurricane, and a homeowner who has a policy that 
covers wind damage but excludes coverage for flood damage. A 
lot of the damage is likely to be attributable both to winds and 
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flooding. Anti-concurrent causation language potentially pro-
vides the insurer with a contract-based argument for why none 
of the damage is covered by the policy. 
This Article is primarily focused on insurance for cybersecu-
rity events, so the most relevant potential policyholders are busi-
nesses. When businesses are considering insurance coverage, 
they typically consider first-party coverage and third-party cov-
erage.226 First-party coverage applies to the policyholder’s losses 
from things like damaged property and lost earnings.227 An all-
risk policy is a broad type of first-party policy.228 Third-party 
coverage is about the policyholder’s potential liability to others 
who have been injured. CGL policies are generally the broadest 
type of third-party coverage. Companies may also have errors & 
omissions policies (E&O), crime policies, and directors & officers 
policies (D&O), and if the business wants more coverage, they 
may also purchase umbrella policies.229 Lawyers and other pro-
fessionals often have professional liability policies.230 
The extent to which these traditional policies cover losses 
from cybersecurity events, however, is a frequent point of con-
tention.231 For claims that involve injuries to property, CGL pol-
icies have traditionally emphasized physical loss or damage, 
though some policies may include coverage for loss of use of tan-
gible property.232 As businesses have become more reliant on 
computers, coverage for intangible losses has seemed to grow, 
with a number of courts concluding that data-loss injuries are 
covered233—but as those losses themselves grow, coverage for 
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those losses has seemingly shrunk with the addition of new ex-
clusions.234 
1. Insurance Law 
Insurance law is generally based on contract law, and like-
wise is governed by state law. Almost 150 years ago, the Su-
preme Court held in Paul v. Virginia that “[i]ssuing a policy of 
insurance is not a transaction of commerce[]” and thus the in-
surance industry is not included within Congress’s purview un-
der the Commerce Clause.235 This view was largely overruled in 
1944 in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n.236 
The South-Eastern Underwriters case concerned indictments 
over rate fixing by several entities. Chief Justice Stone dissented 
from the decision, stating that “the rule of stare decisis embodies 
a wise policy because it is often more important that a rule of 
law be settled than that it be settled right.”237 Congress may 
have agreed with Chief Justice Stone, as they passed the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act of 1945 the following year, officially deferring 
to states’ authority to regulate the “business of insurance.”238 
Above, we noted that insurance companies often collaborate 
with each other to pool information about losses and rates. In 
most industries, cooperation among competitors violates federal 
antitrust law, but this is not the case in the insurance indus-
try.239 In passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, Congress de-
clared that it was in the public interest to leave regulation and 
taxation of the insurance industry to the states.240 The Act ap-
plies to the “business of insurance.”241 States may have different 
interpretations of what constitutes the business of insurance, 
though most of them use some version of the three-prong test 
crafted by the Supreme Court.242 In Union Labor Life Insurance 
Co. v. Pireno, the Supreme Court held that the business of insur-
ance includes practices that: (1) have “the effect of transferring 
 
 234. See Podolak, supra note 8, at 398 (noting ISO’s creation of an exclusion 
for harm to electronic data). 
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 237. Id. at 579 (Stone, C.J. dissenting). 
 238. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2012). 
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 240. Bailey, supra note 20, at 25. 
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or spreading a policyholder’s risk”; (2) are “an integral part of 
the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured”; 
and (3) are “limited to entities within the insurance industry.”243 
The McCarran-Ferguson Act explicitly excludes the insur-
ance industry from the reach of federal antitrust statutes, except 
on issues related to agreements or acts of boycott, coercion, or 
intimidation.244 Parties have litigated questions about the ex-
tent to which the McCarran-Ferguson Act preempts the applica-
tion of other federal laws, like the Federal Arbitration Act.245 As 
the business of insurance has evolved to include unconventional 
approaches like alternative risk-transfer techniques, the degree 
to which state law will continue to preempt federal law may be-
come a contentious issue, especially regarding the securitization 
of risks.246 
One of the benefits of federal regulation is that the laws and 
enforcement are consistent between states.247 Instead of a unify-
ing federal regime, the insurance industry has the National As-
sociation of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).248 Among other 
things, NAIC provides model acts for how states should regulate 
insurers.249 NAIC suggestions may include insurance rate regu-
lations. Many states have regulations that allow for rates to be 
approved by the state provided that the rates are “adequate, not 
excessive, and not unfairly discriminatory.”250 Some regulators 
have been moving away from more involved rate regulations.251 
Randall warns that the largely private nature of NAIC and its 
lack of accountability to the general public indicate regulatory 
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capture.252 It is unclear how much of the insurance industry’s 
profitability could reasonably be attributed to industry-friendly 
regulations proposed by NAIC. 
In the health insurance industry, a lot of states have regu-
lations pertaining to medical loss ratios. The federal Affordable 
Care Act also has a medical loss ratio provision. Such regulations 
require insurers to spend at least a specific percentage of their 
premiums on health care, leaving the remaining percentage to 
cover administration and marketing with the rest being the in-
surer’s profit.253 A minority of states also have broader excess- 
profit statutes that require insurers to refund to the policyholder 
a portion of their premiums if the insurer’s profits exceed a par-
ticular threshold.254 It may be worthwhile to consider the possi-
bility of an analogous security loss ratio for cyberinsurance.  
A lot of the insurance industry has a fairly low barrier to 
entry, allowing newer companies to enter the insurance market 
more easily.255 Most states have minimum capital requirements 
for insurance companies, which serves as a barrier to entry, but 
also ensures that the market is not flooded by undercapitalized 
insurers.256 
Insurance companies frequently deny or challenge claims. 
Some recent issues in insurance law have focused on whether 
insurance companies can recoup defense costs from policyhold-
ers and how to determine when a claim denial was made in bad 
faith.257 Among other things, insurers may challenge whether a 
claim was based on an occurrence under the policy.258 When 
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courts are asked to evaluate insurance policies, rules of construc-
tion vary depending on the affected party. Courts tend to view 
an insurer’s duty to defend as being a broader obligation than 
its duty to indemnify.259 Courts also typically construe coverage 
terms broadly and exclusions narrowly.260 In spite of this, com-
mentators sometimes perceive courts as being friendlier towards 
insurance companies than towards policyholders.261 
2. Commercial Coverage and CGLs 
In this Section, we will focus on CGL policies to provide in-
sight into commercial insurance coverage. The strengths and 
weaknesses of CGL policies contribute to the health of the insur-
ance industry in general, and are also very important to consider 
in light of our empirical analysis of coverage litigation. 
Businesses often acquire CGL policies to protect against po-
tential losses from third-party injuries.262 The standard CGL 
policy drafted by ISO includes three main types of coverage: Cov-
erage A applies to bodily injury and property-damage liability, 
Coverage B applies to personal and advertising liability, and 
Coverage C applies to medical payments.263 CGL policies often 
impose on the insurer a duty to defend and indemnify the in-
sured.264 
In our analysis of cases, we found a large number of cases 
involving data-based harms where policyholders filed claims un-
der their CGL policy, often under Coverage B.265 The personal 
and advertising injury coverage typically includes privacy inju-
ries caused by the “[o]ral or written publication, in any manner, 
of material that violates a person’s right of privacy.”266 One of 
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the essential questions for CGL policy coverage in data-breach 
cases thus becomes whether the breach constitutes a publica-
tion.267 Litigation has also emphasized Coverage A claims about 
bodily injury and property damage, in which case the focus tends 
to be on whether the claim arises from an injury to tangible prop-
erty or the loss of use of tangible property.268 Insurers have been 
increasingly challenging claims under both categories of cover-
age, making cyberinsurance more necessary to cover these mod-
ern injuries.269 
Exclusions impose limits on coverage, and over the years, 
new exclusions have been added to standard CGL policies. Some 
of these exclusions are what we categorize as definitional exclu-
sions, where the exclusionary language is added to a definition 
within the policy. In 2001, ISO altered the definition of property 
damage to exclude harm to electronic data.270 Other exclusions 
are listed in sections about coverage, instead of in the definitions 
section of the policy. Policies often exclude claims about the pol-
icyholder’s completed work, or claims that arise from intentional 
acts.271 ISO recently amended the standard policy language to 
exclude coverage for injuries “arising out of any access to or dis-
closure of any person’s or organization’s confidential or personal 
information.”272 
As a creature of contract law, the interpretation of insurance 
contracts often turns on a court’s interpretation of the language. 
For example, some coverage language refers to claims “arising 
out of” a type of injury, but other policies may refer to claims 
that “result from” a type of injury.273 Podolak notes that “arising 
out of” tends to be interpreted more broadly than the phrase “re-
sult from.”274 The interpretation may also vary depending on 
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where it is in the policy. Scales observes that the phrase “arising 
out of” tends to be construed more broadly when it applies to 
coverage, and more narrowly when it applies to exclusions.275 
3. Cyber Insurance 
Arguments for electronic-harm coverage under a CGL policy 
are facing an increasingly uphill battle with recent amendments 
to standard CGL policy language. This is one reason for the in-
crease in popularity of cyber-specific insurance policies. Cyber-
insurance can be defined as “the transfer of financial risk asso-
ciated with network and computer incidents to a third party.”276 
As insurers increasingly narrow their CGL policies to ex-
clude claims for data breaches,277 cyberinsurance becomes more 
necessary for businesses of all sizes. It is also possible that cyber-
insurance will become essentially mandatory as vendors and cli-
ents increasingly draft contracts to require such policies.278 Yet 
a 2013 study by the Ponemon Institute found that fewer than a 
third of respondents reported that their organization had cyber-
insurance.279 
Nelson and Simek report that the cyberinsurance market is 
“the fastest growing segment of the insurance industry.”280 The 
2016 Betterley Report on the Cyber/Privacy Insurance Market 
notes that there has been a lot of growth in the number of poli-
cies being issued to small and midsized companies.281 Policy 
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makers at the highest levels have indicated interest in the cyber-
insurance market.282 The rapid growth of the cyberinsurance 
market presents a challenge for regulators, insurers, and policy-
holders. 
Insurance companies are faced with many challenges when 
designing cyberinsurance policies. Above, we noted that premi-
ums that are too low or too high can cause far-reaching prob-
lems.283 There is also an inherent informational asymmetry, be-
cause the policyholder knows significantly more about their day-
to-day risks than would the insurer. With cybersecurity policies, 
the uncertainty is magnified by a lack of actuarial data.284 To the 
extent that cybersecurity risks are correlated risks, this greatly 
increases the insurer’s risk exposure.285 
Insurers work very hard to realistically identify and address 
these problems in policy language. Figure 1 illustrates how in-
formational asymmetry between the insurers and the insured 
can create a vicious circle, resulting in an insurance market 
characterized by high premiums, broad exclusions, and insur-
ance caps. All of these policy mechanisms are designed to ad-
dress the downstream risks posed by adverse selection and 
moral hazard, which are present at the outset due to the infor-
mational asymmetry between the insurers and the insured. Ul-
timately, the only way to reliably address the problems in the 
cyberinsurance market is to improve risk assessment (which in-
cludes technological risk, legal risk, and portfolio risk), reduce 
informational asymmetry, and counteract data scarcity. 
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Figure 1: Issues with the Cyberinsurance Market 
 
ISO provides their subscribers with a standard form, the in-
formation security protection policy,286 though this form may not 
be enough to address the constantly evolving risks. The market 
is affected by a lot of unknowns concerning the technology and 
the scope of the risks, further complicated by a lack of actuarial 
data.287 Scales remarked that a major problem facing the Na-
tional Flood Insurance Program was “[h]ow to price a product no 
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one had sold for thirty years, such that consumers would actu-
ally purchase it and the pool would remain solvent.”288 This ob-
servation is also an effective summary of one of the biggest prob-
lems faced by insurers who want to offer cyberinsurance. This 
uncertainty has a cost, as one study notes that the ratio of pre-
miums to the coverage limit for cyberinsurance is triple the ratio 
of other liability policies and six times higher than the ratio for 
property insurance.289 
We previously explained some of the frequent problems en-
countered when addressing cyber harms through technology and 
the law. In the previous Section, we discussed the narrowing of 
CGL policies to make it harder to successfully file claims over 
cyber harms like data breaches. Cyberinsurance has the poten-
tial to help mitigate both of these problems, if used correctly. 
Cyberinsurance is already a billion dollar market, but these pol-
icies continue to represent a mere sliver of the premiums col-
lected for commercial-line insurance policies in the United 
States.290 
In an earlier Part, we noted that one method that legisla-
tures have used to address commercial cyber risks is to enact 
data breach statutes that require notification to affected individ-
uals.291 Cyberinsurance policies often cover these kinds of ex-
penses.292 However, data-breach statutes can cause a snag in 
claim disputes if the policy includes language prohibiting policy-
holders from making voluntary payments without obtaining 
prior approval from the insurer.293 The question then becomes 
whether the expenses from breach notifications required by stat-
ute are voluntary. 
Cyberinsurance policies have been evolving to address 
things like business interruption coverage, direct and indirect 
causation of privacy injuries and injuries caused by intellectual 
property infringement, and cyber extortion.294 A cyber policy is 
likely to exclude property damage covered by real-world property 
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insurance, and real-world property insurance is likely to exclude 
cyber harms.295 Major cyber policy providers include ACE, AIG, 
the Beazley Group, Marsh, Liberty International Underwriters, 
Chubb Corp., and Zurich Insurance.296 
The moral hazard noted above with insurance generally is 
also prevalent with cyberinsurance. If a policyholder decides to 
invest in cyberinsurance instead of cybersecurity, this can in-
crease the risk of loss.297 To mitigate the moral hazard problem, 
any cyberinsurance solution must be accompanied by require-
ments for security audits.298 Some cyberinsurance products offer 
risk management services, including privacy training and credit 
monitoring.299 Coverage may include losses from extortion and 
various data-breach expenses, though the policy language may 
impose time limitations or require the use of designated crisis-
management vendors.300 These elements are intended to reduce 
some of the risk in this volatile environment. 
Even so, cyberinsurance remains a risky field. A study of the 
Nordic cyberinsurance market notes that the lack of experience 
and data affects insurers’ ability to assess risks in this emerging 
market.301 The normal informational asymmetry exists between 
policyholder and insurer, but the overall risk to all policyholders 
is also a big unknown.302 One possible solution is to create an 
independent body to allow insurers to share information about 
claim costs from data breaches and similar events.303 Another 
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proposal concerns putting ISPs in charge of cyberinsurance be-
cause of their control over the infrastructure,304 though this may 
not work in all markets. 
Some insurers attempt to address the unknown risks by re-
quiring policyholders to comply with security standards in order 
for their security practices to be construed as reasonable.305 In 
order for the cyberinsurance market to be profitable for insurers 
though, they need a lot of customers. To get a lot of customers, 
the insurer cannot set the bar too high in terms of how strong a 
potential client’s security has to be to get insurance.306 Histori-
cally, cyberinsurance providers have used questionnaires to as-
sess potential clients, though it is becoming more common to 
have specific conversations with the potential clients to get a 
sense of their vulnerabilities and risk-management controls.307 
Insurers also sometimes use third-party cybersecurity special-
ists to evaluate a potential policyholder’s risks.308 
One of the differences between CGL policies and cyberinsur-
ance policies concerns timing. CGL policies are often occurrence-
based, while cyberpolicies are often claims-based.309 This differ-
ence is likely out of necessity. CGL policies are typically designed 
to address injuries that are immediately apparent, like a slip-
and-fall accident in a store. The date of the incident is often easy 
to discern, so it is trivial to determine whether the occurrence 
happened within the policy period. Compare this to a data 
breach, where the network operator may go a year or more with-
out realizing that anything was lost. A claims-made policy is ar-
guably better suited for a situation where there is a gap between 
when an incident occurs and when it is discovered.310 For either 
type of policy, however, the policy will still likely have provisions 
concerning notice, and it may be wise for a policyholder to obtain 
a policy that has a provision for an extended reporting period.311 
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C. EXISTING SCHEMES 
Analogies are helpful when addressing a new problem in the 
legal field. Cybersecurity is no exception. This area may yet 
prove to be sui generis, but that hasn’t stopped policy makers 
from trying to drum up concern by warning about a “Cyber Pearl 
Harbor,”312 and some commentators have compared cybersecu-
rity issues to things like floods caused by accidents at reser-
voirs313 and the looting of antiquities from archaeological 
sites.314 This Section follows this trend by juxtaposing cyber-
insurance issues with workers’ compensation on the one hand 
and NFIP on the other.315 Zureich and Graebe have made similar 
observations about cyberinsurance issues and the growth of em-
ployment practice liability insurance during the 1990s.316 In the 
latter situation, employment practice liability insurance 
emerged as a specialized coverage as insurers narrowed general 
liability policies to exclude these types of claims.317 Another op-
tion, though one that we do not consider in detail, is the possibil-
ity of the government serving a reinsurance role, similar to its 
role under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act.318 
1. Workers’ Compensation 
We chose to look at the origin of workers’ compensation in-
surance because, like cyber risks, the risk of worker injury is 
ubiquitous and hard to predict. The workers’ compensation 
model focuses on the lowest-cost avoider, the employer. 
One thing that we believe makes workers’ compensation in-
surance a reasonable analog to cyberinsurance is the severity 
and frequency of possible injuries. Risk is often described as the 
product of the probability that an event will occur times the se-
verity of the harm if it occurs.319 Fire insurance is designed to 
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address a devastating but fairly low-probability event.320 Work-
ers’ compensation insurance is designed to address the higher 
probability of generally smaller injuries.321 While there is a po-
tential for catastrophic cyberattacks, most cyberattacks will not 
rise to that level,322 yet the risk is still significant because the 
probability for a less-severe event is very high. 
Scholars trace the origin of workers’ compensation to Impe-
rial Germany and then later to Great Britain, though the British 
law was less comprehensive than the German law.323 Fowler 
points out that Caribbean pirates also had a form of workers’ 
compensation, as crew members who lost body parts received a 
larger share of treasure based on their injuries.324 
Workers’ compensation is handled by states individually, so 
it is similar to how insurance in general is handled.325 In 1972, 
there was an attempt to federalize workers’ compensation be-
cause of deficiencies in state programs at the time, but the push 
for federalization fizzled out when a lot of states started reform-
ing their workers’ compensation systems voluntarily.326 
The basic premise of workers’ compensation is to provide fi-
nancial protection for workers who are injured on the job.327 The 
system provides injured workers with more certain remedies and 
allows workers and employers to avoid costlier tort litigation.328 
Workers’ compensation was needed in part because employers 
 
 320. Christian Schade et al., Protecting Against Low Probability Disasters: 
The Role of Worry 2 (Univ. Pa., Working Paper No. 2009-12-23, 2009). 
 321. See Ginny Kipling, Employer Tips for Managing Workers’ Comp, BENE-
FITS PRO (May 23, 2011), http://www.benefitspro.com/2011/05/23/employer-tips 
-for-managing-workers-comp?t=employee-participation&slreturn=1504563241 
(asserting that while injuries are guaranteed, the vast majority are inconse-
quential). 
 322. See Taylor Armerding, Catastrophic Cyber Attack on U.S. Grid Possible, 
but Not Likely, CSO (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.csoonline.com/article/3055718/ 
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Hylton & Laymon, supra note 105, at 136–37. 
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 326. Torrey, supra note 323, at 12–13. 
 327. Hylton & Laymon, supra note 105, at 136 (explaining the origins of 
workers’ compensation). 
 328. Gabel & Mansfield, supra note 325, at 75. 
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could use defenses like contributory negligence and assumption 
of risk to avoid civil liability for worker accidents.329 
With the workers’ compensation system, employees can re-
cover medical expenses and a percentage of their lost income.330 
In return, employers and insurers are safe from more expensive 
litigation and the possibility of higher compensatory or punitive 
damages.331 Another protection for employers is the exclusive 
remedy doctrine, which limits a worker to redressing their inju-
ries through the workers’ compensation system, instead of 
through civil litigation.332 There are, however, many exceptions 
to the exclusive remedy doctrine.333 For example, under Califor-
nia law, if there is fraudulent concealment of a worker’s injury, 
the exclusive remedy doctrine does not apply.334 
Workers’ compensation insurance is mostly provided by pri-
vate insurance companies,335 but a handful of states operate 
state-managed insurance funds.336 Many employees with work-
ers’ compensation claims will settle their dispute in exchange for 
a lump-sum payment, which benefits employers because they 
are able to close the case and shift the work injury cost to other 
nonoccupational payers such as Medicare.337 In response to an 
increasing number of settlements that favored employers, many 
jurisdictions started to require the existence of a bona fide dis-
pute about benefit entitlement before the injured worker can 
agree to a settlement.338 
Workers’ compensation cases involving standard injuries 
are less complicated than cases involving occupational illnesses 
that develop over a long period of exposure.339 In the latter types 
of cases, employers are often successful in challenging cover-
age.340 This may be due, in part, to most workers’ compensation 
 
 329. Torrey, supra note 323, at 7. 
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 335. Rice, supra note 214, at 1022. 
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policies being occurrence-based instead of claims-made.341 This 
is further support for why it is more appropriate to take a claims-
made approach to cyber insurance policies, because, like asbes-
tos exposure, the full effects of a cyberattack may be unknown 
until long after the initial security breach. 
Premiums for workers’ compensation insurance are often 
set using class rating or experience rating.342 With class rating, 
the premium is based on the industry of the business.343 With 
experience rating, the premium is calculated based, in part, on 
that business’s losses from previous years.344 Either of these ap-
proaches could work for establishing cyberinsurance premiums, 
though we recommend an alternative. 
A less-common method for setting premiums is retrospective 
ratings. When ratings are set retrospectively, the policyholder 
will pay a minimum fee to the insurer, and then the insurer will 
take care of the costs during a policy period and bill the policy-
holder at the end of the policy period for the amount up to the 
policyholder’s maximum out-of-pocket costs.345 If there are no 
incidents one year, the firm’s premiums may exceed their losses, 
but the next year may see a large number of incidents, such that 
the policyholder’s losses reach the policy cap.346 A retrospective 
rating approach may be an appealing option for cyberinsurance 
coverage for data breaches, because it provides a degree of flexi-
bility as the insurers and policyholders adapt to new threats and 
new insurance products. 
Workers’ compensation statutes often include caps, at least 
for temporary and partial disabilities.347 Some states also cap 
the compensation available for permanent total disabilities and 
 
 341. Unique Issues of Claims-Made Policies, SCOTT SIMMONDS, https://www 
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 342. Hylton & Laymon, supra note 105, at 146. 
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 346. Hylton & Laymon, supra note 105, at 145–46. 
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fatalities.348 In Arkansas, for example, the lifetime cap for per-
manent total disability is currently just over $200,000.349 These 
caps are arguably not good public policy, but something similar 
might work in a modified approach to cyberinsurance, where the 
matter is less likely to be a life-or-death decision. For example, 
if data breach or identity theft insurance were widely available 
to individuals, a lifetime cap might make such a program more 
financially manageable. With current models, however, such a 
system is unlikely because consumers are rarely held liable for 
fraudulent charges.350 In the alternative, regulations could po-
tentially introduce minimum and maximum award amounts for 
individuals whose data is compromised in a data breach. 
According to Fowler, workers’ compensation statutes in the 
United States address eight common elements: (1) what triggers 
an entitlement; (2) a no-fault approach concerning the em-
ployee’s injury; (3) only employees can receive benefits; (4) wage 
benefits are a percentage of the employee’s weekly wage, and 
there is no compensation for pain and suffering; (5) the workers’ 
compensation system provides the “exclusive remedy” available 
for a worker while receiving benefits;351 (6) if a third party 
caused the worker’s injury, the worker can sue the third party, 
but the financial award must be shared with the employer to re-
imburse the employer’s costs; (7) the compensation system is 
state-run and not based on traditional judicial proceedings, the 
system tends to favor awarding benefits; and (8) employers must 
obtain insurance or meet self-insurance mandates to cover work-
ers’ compensation costs.352 This informal legal framework for 
workers’ compensation is helpful for shaping questions that can 
aid regulatory support of the emerging cyber insurance market. 
 
 348. E.g., Workers Compensation Claim State Environmental Guide - Arkan-
sas, TRAVELERS, https://www.travelers.com/iw-documents/claims/workers 
-compensation/ce-10174wcbenefitoverview-ar.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2017) 
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For example: 
 
(1) What triggers the payout for a cyber insurance policy? 
(2) Do any factors reduce the payout, like the policy-
holder’s liability? 
(3) Who is eligible for coverage? 
(4) In the case of business interruption expenses, what 
kinds of expenses are covered? Cost of restoring services? 
Lost profits? 
(5) Does cyber insurance coverage affect legal rights? 
Would a data breach settlement affect legal rights? 
(6) How does coverage apply, and how should data breach 
litigation be affected, when a third party causes the in-
jury? 
(7) Should cybersecurity event coverage issues be ad-
dressed through legislation? Could an insurance-based 
approach be adapted to reduce the costs of litigating data 
breaches? 
(8) Should the government mandate cyber insurance for 
companies of a certain size or in certain industry sectors 
involving critical infrastructure? 
 
Looking at the third question, most discussion about cyber-
insurance assumes that businesses will obtain cyberinsurance 
coverage. However, the workers’ compensation system poten-
tially provides a model for a consumer-facing approach where 
consumers, who are subjected to the risks of data insecurity by 
virtue of their participation in the modern economy, could be cov-
ered through a policy issued to data-service providers. This is 
one potential approach to cyberinsurance, though it may not be 
desirable because there are simply too many different entities 
with access to an individual consumer’s information. An em-
ployer-focused system is much simpler for workers’ compensa-
tion because most individuals only have one employer, but a sim-
ilar dynamic does not exist with respect to information-related 
services. 
2. National Flood Insurance Program 
As a second part of our analysis, we chose to consider NFIP 
as a potential model for an approach to cyberinsurance. For 
homeowners and business owners, floods pose a huge risk that 
could destroy years of investment in a moment. Some regions are 
inherently at greater risk of flood, but many of these regions also 
have a lot of economic and agricultural value. It is economically 
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sensible to allow people to purchase flood insurance to encourage 
investment in these regions. 
Unfortunately, the demand for flood insurance is highest in 
flood-prone areas, but not so high in areas where floods are un-
likely, leading to a market with poorly spread risk.353 Congress 
enacted the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (NFIA) to cre-
ate “a reasonable method of sharing the risk of flood losses.”354 
Prior to the NFIA, flood insurance was a risky bet for insurance 
companies.355 With the NFIP, the government provided some 
tools for offsetting some of that risk by, among other things, sub-
sidizing flood insurance premiums.356 The NFIP conditions par-
ticipation in the program on commitments to regulate develop-
ment in high-risk areas.357 Because of its purpose as a risk-
mitigating regulatory program, the NFIP could serve as a guide 
for future regulatory efforts to support cybersecurity and the 
cyberinsurance market. 
Under the NFIP, the Federal Emergency Management Ad-
ministration (FEMA) creates minimum standards for develop-
ment in flood-prone areas, and once a community has adopted 
FEMA’s guidelines, residents are able to purchase flood insur-
ance.358 FEMA drafts flood insurance policies and establishes 
community-specific insurance rates, and insurance companies 
act as agents of FEMA under the Write Your Own program.359 
With the Write Your Own program, the NFIP underwrites the 
policies, and the private insurers who sell the policies get ap-
proximately thirty percent of the premiums as commission.360 
Scales notes that this arrangement is similar to ERISA, in the 
sense that, under the latter, “private health insurers administer 
insurance contracts governed by federal common law, while be-
ing underwritten entirely by employers.”361 
 
 353. Michelle E. Boardman, Known Unknowns: The Illusion of Terrorism In-
surance, 93 GEO. L.J. 783, 828 (2005). 
 354. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2012); cf. Kosseff, supra note 11, at 417 (asserting 
that Congress enacted the NFIP to address the issue of “building homes on riv-
ers and other floodplains”). 
 355. McMillan, supra note 173, at 486–87. 
 356. Id. at 487. 
 357. Id. at 476. 
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Sometimes with the NFIP, policyholders may be placed at a 
disadvantage compared to other types of insurance. The NFIP 
imposes some procedural requirements on policyholders, includ-
ing a sixty-day deadline to submit proof of loss after a flood. 
Missing that deadline is often the basis for claim denials.362 The 
fact that the private insurers are not underwriting flood claims 
can also create an incentive for insurers to categorize claims as 
flood damage so that the loss falls to the government instead of 
the insurer.363 
A study by the American Institutes for Research cites sev-
eral successes of the NFIP, including the successful prevention 
of billions of dollars of flood damage, reduction in federal expend-
itures, and the fact that millions of people are able to purchase 
flood insurance on their properties.364 One study from 2006 esti-
mated that “approximately one-half of homes most at risk are 
insured against flood.”365 It is somewhat surprising that the in-
surance rate is not higher, considering that banks and mortgage 
providers have ample financial incentives to require borrowers 
to purchase flood insurance in flood-prone areas.366 
Subsidies are another core element of the NFIP. In part be-
cause of the lack of actuarial data, the NFIP initially subsidized 
flood insurance policies so that the program could start provid-
ing affordable services while the data was still being collected.367 
The NFIP was designed to gradually reduce the amount of sub-
sidization over time, and as of a decade ago, somewhere between 
twenty-eight percent and thirty-five percent of NFIP policies 
were still subsidized.368 
Some scholars, however, question whether the NFIP has ac-
tually been a boon or a bane for communities with high flood 
risks, like Houston, Texas. In 2001, Tropical Storm Allison de-
stroyed entire neighborhoods in Houston with flooding, but by 
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2007, many of those neighborhoods had been rebuilt with brand 
new townhouses.369 Scales expresses criticism of flood control 
projects in general, asserting that such projects merely buy 
time.370 
Some question whether this kind of flood program creates a 
moral hazard. When a community has flood controls in place and 
flood insurance available, more people may move to the commu-
nity because they believe that it is now physically and financially 
safe to do so.371 A community may have been safer with new con-
trols at an earlier size, but growth encroaches further onto the 
floodplain, increasing the risk again.372 By encouraging manage-
ment instead of abandonment of floodplains, the NFIP may have 
actually increased economic risks.373 
Local governments and developers are generally aware of 
flood risks,374 but the availability of flood insurance allows par-
ties to partially externalize the consequences. McMillan argues 
that through the mechanism of easily available flood insurance, 
the NFIP “encourages irresponsible behavior and contributes to 
loss of life.”375 Manns also notes that the federal government has 
historically undercharged for flood insurance.376 If these criti-
cisms are accurate, NFIP clearly has a moral hazard problem.377 
Scales suggests addressing the NFIP’s weaknesses by gradually 
eliminating subsidies for everyone except low-income homeown-
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ers, and by requiring all homeowner policies to include flood in-
surance.378 
The NFIP provides a partial blueprint for a regulatory ap-
proach to cyberinsurance, but it also provides lots of warnings. 
Like flood insurance, cyberinsurance is an area where the risks 
are significant and often unpredictable. Government subsidies 
for cyberinsurance could support this growing market while 
more data is collected. More importantly, the broad availability 
of cyberinsurance will support further innovation in the infor-
mation technology sector. The NFIP’s Write Your Own model, 
however, appears to give insurers a windfall as they collect pre-
miums without actually bearing the risk, and should not be 
adopted for cyberinsurance without significant changes. Ulti-
mately, a cyberinsurance regulatory system must strike a bal-
ance between encouraging innovation and discouraging irre-
sponsible investments. 
D. FINANCIAL MARKETS 
The cyberinsurance market is growing, but insurers are in 
a bind because of the lack of actuarial data. Alternative risk-
transfer methods, especially those that employ financial mar-
kets, may be an effective alternative.379 Sibindi argues that in-
surance has experienced a paradigm shift from indemnity to 
value enhancement.380 Financial markets themselves have po-
tential as a tool to improve cybersecurity,381 and an approach to 
cyberinsurance that focuses on derivatives-based alternative 
risk transfer could hit two birds with one stone. Dozens of insur-
ance companies already use derivatives in financial markets to 
hedge against risks.382 Global banking giant Credit Suisse raised 
eyebrows (and capital) in 2016 when it created a catastrophe 
bond to cover itself against internal catastrophes like cyberat-
tacks and rogue traders.383 This Section therefore examines fi-
nancial markets and their intersection with the insurance indus-
try. 
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The securitization of insurance risks is a topic that has re-
ceived some attention.384 Securitization can be defined as “a 
method of converting illiquid financial assets into liquid market-
able assets.”385 Organizations can use securitization to transfer 
risks to investors in a way that is functionally similar to how 
insurance providers pool and distribute risk.386 The potential le-
gal issues of securitization of insurance are considerable. Should 
such practices be covered by state law as being part of the busi-
ness of insurance? Should the securities be regulated by the 
SEC? To the extent that the securitized risks are cast as deriva-
tives, that may also require the involvement of the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).387 
Alternative risk-transfer products generally function like fi-
nancial instruments instead of traditional insurance policies.388 
Catastrophe bonds, or cat bonds, have a similar function. Catas-
trophe bonds have existed since the 1990s and were originally 
designed to insure against natural disasters.389 Catastrophe 
bonds are a private-market solution, but they also typically fall 
within the SEC’s regulatory power, providing some assurance of 
oversight.390 In the past, catastrophe bonds have been traded as 
options at the Chicago Board of Trade.391 Scales notes, however, 
that catastrophe bonds can have high transaction costs.392 These 
costs are often related to their nature as securities, and can in-
clude things like underwriting fees, fees imposed by ratings 
agencies, and legal fees for things like preparing disclosures for 
investors.393 
Insurance companies often seek their own insurance in the 
reinsurance market, and financial markets provide a distributed 
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alternative to reinsurance.394 As such, a shift to securities like 
catastrophe bonds could potentially have negative effects on the 
reinsurance market.395 In May 2016, Credit Suisse Group sold a 
variation of a catastrophe bond to insure itself “against the risk 
of rogue traders, cyber hacking and accounting fraud.”396 The 
long-term benefits and pitfalls of such bonds are currently un-
known. 
There are many possible forms that securitization could 
take in the cyberinsurance context. Parasidis presents a pro-
posal for utilizing financial markets to address uncertainty in 
the health care industry, through the trade of derivatives based 
on health outcomes indices.397 A similar model may be possible 
for cybersecurity using a security outcomes index, with a value 
that is tied to measures of security throughout different indus-
tries. 
III.  CYBERINSURANCE LITIGATION   
In the preceding Part, we presented perspectives about the 
inadequacy of cybersecurity preparations, laws, and current ap-
proaches to cyber risk shifting. Addressing these problems re-
quires, at the outset, an understanding of current benchmarks. 
For this reason, we have compiled and analyzed lawsuits con-
cerning coverage issues and electronic harms. 
In addition to providing a benchmark for more general rec-
ommendations, a study of relevant insurance litigation is also 
potentially very valuable for the overall goal of shaping cyber-
insurance policies. To these ends, we thoroughly studied over 
140 cases that implicate issues relevant to cyberinsurance, most 
of which were litigated through to a decision on the merits. For 
the cases that concerned third-party liability, almost all of the 
underlying litigation was between private companies or citizens. 
There were, however, three cases that examined insurance cov-
erage for FTC actions.398 
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A. METHODOLOGY 
To obtain as many cases as possible, we searched Bloomberg 
Law and Westlaw using a variety of search terms, including 
those outlined in Table 1. In addition to cases identified with 
specific search terms, some cases were identified because they 
were cited in other cases. 
 
Table 1: Sample Search Strings 
 
We also searched federal dockets in Bloomberg Law by fil-
tering for the insurance contract nature-of-suit code (110) and 
looking for keywords including (data /2 breach) and the prefix 
cyber. A shortcoming of Bloomberg Law searches that should be 
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noted is that these searches were limited to information in the 
dockets. If these terms were found within the names of the par-
ties or their contact information, or if the terms were in the de-
scription field of the docket, these cases would be identified by 
the search. The searches would also find litigation documents 
that had already been uploaded to the docket pursuant to a re-
quest from another party, provided that the documents were in 
a format that allowed for their text to be searched with an auto-
mated tool. 
The suit-code-limited Bloomberg Law search yielded 80 re-
sults when looking for (data /2 breach) and 254 results when 
looking for the prefix cyber. There was some overlap between the 
two, and we also uncovered the aforementioned issue with 
Bloomberg searches. While examining the over 300 cases, we 
had to manually request the complaint in approximately 100 
cases. One of the reasons that there may have been more search 
results for cyber is that it is a fairly common prefix that we found 
to also be used as part of the contact e-mail addresses for several 
attorneys. We also found a small number of cases that did not 
seem to be properly categorized as insurance litigation. In addi-
tion, we found a small number of cases that were relevant to our 
study but that were categorized with suit code 109 (Contract: 
Other).399 
We then reviewed all of the results of each search string and 
identified the cases with the most potential relevance to cyber-
insurance disputes. Once the universe of cases was identified, we 
consolidated those cases into a single spreadsheet and populated 
the spreadsheet with standard case information: case name, ci-
tation, docket number, date of filing, and date of disposition, 
among numerous other fields. Currently, we have 146 fully ana-
lyzed cases in our CLAD repository. 
Selection bias is an important concern in virtually any em-
pirical study, and this study is no different. By focusing on liti-
gation, our study is inherently concerned with insurance claims 
that are disputed, rather than the potentially hundreds or thou-
sands of claims that an insurance company pays without chal-
lenge or reservation. Because of this selection bias, our study 
should not be viewed as a comprehensive guide about insurance 
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activity. It is, however, a good representation of the more con-
tentious issues that arise in cyber-related insurance litigation, 
since these claims could not be resolved without initiating litiga-
tion, and, in most of the cases in our database, continuing litiga-
tion through to a decision on the merits. 
Furthermore, our database is not comprehensive with re-
gard to insurance coverage for privacy injuries, because that is 
outside the scope of our current analysis. In creating our data-
base, we focused on intangible harms that were reasonably con-
nected to technology issues. Because of our interest in intangible 
harms, some of the cases that we analyzed focused on intellec-
tual property infringement. We chose to exclude many cases in-
volving privacy rights created by statute, like the Telecommuni-
cations Consumer Privacy Act (TCPA) and the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRA). Our database includes some TCPA and 
FCRA cases, but those are limited to cases where the issues were 
more centered on computers and information technology. Future 
work might examine litigation and insurance disputes involving 
these specific statutes. 
Because insurance law is generally left to the states, it is 
possible that there were many more state cases than we were 
able to access. Each state has its own method of record keeping, 
and, while it is fairly easy to find information about trial-level 
federal litigation, most states do not make detailed trial infor-
mation available in an easily searchable form on the web or 
through the subscription services that our researchers could ac-
cess. 
B. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
We tracked a large number of variables across cases, includ-
ing the duration of litigation and where the cases were litigated. 
Where possible, we analyzed both the district court and appel-
late court opinions, so our database includes some cases at mul-
tiple court levels. In total, we identified 121 unique cases. Of the 
121 unique cases, 68 cases were brought by the insured after a 
claim denial, and 53 cases were brought by an insurer seeking a 
declaratory judgment that there was no coverage. Because some 
of these cases were affirmed and some were overturned, we will 
generally discuss our data in terms of the overall number, 146 
cases.400 
 
 400. There is an exception for situations where the total number of cases was 
lower for other reasons, such as the analysis focusing on cases that were decided 
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Table 2: Case Duration, Federal and State 
Duration Federal State 
< 1 year 37 4 
1–2 years 40 9 
2–3 years 12 4 
3–4 years 9 2 
4+ years 4 2 
N/A 2 5 
Ongoing 14 2 
Total 118 28 
 
Of the 146 cases in our database, 118 were in federal court 
and 28 were in state court. We categorized cases by duration. If 
litigation lasted for 11 months or less, it was categorized as < 1 
year. If litigation lasted between 12 to 23 months, we categorized 
this as “1–2 years.” The “2–3 years” category was for cases that 
lasted between 24 and 35 months, the “3–4 years” category was 
for cases that lasted between 36 and 47 months, and litigation 
that continued for 48 months or more was placed into the “4+ 
years” category. At the time of this writing, there were 14 ongo-
ing federal cases and 2 ongoing state cases. The cases in the 
“N/A” row of Table 2 currently have unknown status for one rea-
son or another. Approximately 33.9% of cases in federal court 
were resolved within 1–2 years, compared to approximately 
32.1% of cases in state court. Seventy-five percent of federal 
cases were resolved within 3 years. 
We were unable to identify a filing date in 7 cases, and we 
have identified 7 cases so far that were filed in 2016. The latter 
number is likely to increase as more cases progress to stages 
where their documents become more searchable. Figure 2 de-
picts 5-year increments to illustrate how the number of cases 
filed on these topics has increased over the last 30 years. 
 
by a judge or jury, in which instance we omitted cases that were settled or on-
going. 
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Figure 2: Cases by Filing Year 
 
We also tracked cases according to the type of policy at issue. 
There were cases involving attorney malpractice policies, busi-
ness income insurance policies, technology errors and omissions 
policies, umbrella policies, crime policies, and CGL policies, 
among others. The descriptive names of the policies in the cases 
varied, and we categorized the cases into several groups accord-
ing to the type of policy at issue: CGL policies, crime policies, 
D&O policies, first party policies, technology policies, multiple 
policies, and a catch-all category for other policies.401 We further 
identified which cases involving multiple policies involved a 
technology-related insurance policy. As the following figure 
shows, we identified 58 cases that involved just a CGL policy, 
and 5 cases that involved a CGL policy and a technology-related 
policy. The 11 cases in the “Multiple Policies” category did not 
involve a technology-related policy. In Figure 3, the policy cate-
gories are listed in the order they appear in the pie chart, start-
ing with 58 cases involving CGL policies and proceeding clock-
wise. 
 
 401. The “other” category is the category to which the attorney malpractice 
policy case was assigned. The other cases in this category involved home insur-
ance, a garage liability policy, four professional liability policies, a contract with 
a payment processor and an acquiring bank, and a bond. The last two cases 
were very relevant to our inquiry into cyber-risk-shifting, though they were not 
traditional insurance policies. 
1 4
10
28
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67
Before 1990 1990–95 1996–2000 2001–05 2006–10 2011–15
Number of Cases Filed, n=132
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Figure 3: Policy Type 
 
Of the 146 cases, 39.2% of the cases solely concerned CGL 
policies. A number of other cases focused on CGL policies and 
other kinds of policies at the same time, and for our purposes, 
we considered cases that involved a CGL policy and an umbrella 
policy to pertain to multiple types of policies. Of the 146 cases, 
15.8% of the cases were solely concerned with a technology-re-
lated policy. Several other cases focused on a technology-related 
policy and another kind of policy. We considered a policy to be 
technology-related if the coverage focused on events relating to 
computers and data. Including cases involving multiple policies, 
there were 32 cases where a technology policy was raised. Most 
of these cases were technology errors and omissions policies, 
though there were also some that were explicitly meant to cover 
cybersecurity events. 
There were many different CGL policy provisions at issue in 
the analyzed cases. For example, many cases focused on the idea 
of tangible property and asked several questions, such as (1) is 
loss of data a harm to physical property?; (2) is loss of data con-
sidered direct physical damage?; and (3) is economic loss a harm 
to tangible property? Several cases also concerned provisions 
about the loss of use of tangible property, and others examined 
whether intellectual-property theft was a form of property dam-
age. Cases also often focused on identifying the injury for policy 
purposes, and the injury categories under the policies included 
personal injury, advertising injury, and privacy injury. 
1
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One case that involved claims of property damage stemming 
from a data breach is RSVT Holdings, LLC v. Main Street Amer-
ica Assurance Co.402 The burger chain Five Guys experienced a 
data breach in 2011, and was sued by Trustco Bank for over 
$100,000 for the fraudulent charges and the cost of replacing 
1701 debit cards.403 RSVT Holdings, the parent company of Five 
Guys, filed suit against its insurer in New York state court, seek-
ing a declaration that the insurer had a duty to defend RSVT in 
the underlying action.404 RSVT based its argument on the provi-
sion in its CGL policy covering “property damage.”405 Property 
damage under the policy was defined as including injury to, or 
loss of use of, tangible property.406 The trial court ruled for 
RSVT, but the appellate court reversed the decision and found 
for the insurer.407 The policy’s definition of tangible property spe-
cifically excluded electronic data, and the appellate court con-
cluded that negligent handling of the electronic data of custom-
ers did not result in property damage under the policy.408 
Some cases turned on the personal and advertising injury 
provisions of CGL policies. For example, in Travelers Indemnity 
Co. v. Portal Healthcare Solutions, LLC, the relevant policy lan-
guage concerned publications as a personal or advertising in-
jury.409 More specifically, the case concerned the publication of 
material that “give[s] unreasonable publicity to . . . [a person’s] 
private li[fe].”410 While the RSVT case focused on data breaches 
as a form of property damage, the Portal case considered data 
breaches as a form of personal or advertising injury. The Fourth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment that the exposure 
 
 402. RSVT Holdings, LLC v. Main St. Am. Assurance Co., 136 A.D.3d 1196 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2016). At the time of this writing, LexisNexis cites the name of 
the plaintiff as RVST Holdings instead of RSVT Holdings. It is also listed as 
RVST in the PDF of the order. It is listed as RSVT in Bloomberg Law and 
Westlaw. RSVT Holdings, LLC is registered in Albany, NY. We have reported 
this discrepancy to LexisNexis. 
 403. See Eric Anderson, Insurer Won’t Have To Cover Five Guys’ Data 
Breach, TIMES UNION (Feb. 18, 2016), http://blog.timesunion.com/business/ 
insurer-wont-have-to-cover-five-guys-data-breach. 
 404. RSVT Holdings, 136 A.D.3d at 1197. 
 405. Id. at 1198. 
 406. Id. 
 407. Id. at 1197. 
 408. Id. at 1198. 
 409. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Portal Healthcare Sols., LLC, 35 F. Supp. 3d 
765, 767 (E.D. Va. 2014), aff ’d per curiam, 644 F. App’x 245, 246 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 410. Portal Healthcare Sols., 644 F. App’x at 247 (quoting Travelers Indem. 
Co., 35 F. Supp. 3d at 771). 
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of patient files was a publication, even in the absence of indica-
tions that a third party had accessed the patient files.411 
We also assigned each case to a single category based on 
subject matter. Some of the cases implicated more than one cat-
egory, and in those cases, we assigned the case to whichever cat-
egory was more prominent. Twenty-one cases concerned a data 
breach, and 13 cases concerned data losses. For our purposes, we 
define a data breach as an incident where an unauthorized third 
party can or does obtain access to sensitive information.412 A 
data loss, on the other hand, can include technicians accidentally 
wiping a customer’s hard disk drive without backing it up.413 
We also examined 3 cases concerning insurance coverage for 
the cost of mitigating the infamous Y2K bug that caused millions 
of people to worry about whether the shift from 1999 to 2000 in 
computer clocks would cause mass chaos at midnight on January 
1, 2000.414 This was because early programmers typically omit-
ted the first 2 digits of the year in their projects in order to save 
space, and it was thought that this bug could cause countless 
errors if the computer started acting as if the year were 1900 
instead of 2000.415 
In Figure 4, there are separate categories for “fraud” (17 
cases), “hacking fraud” (5 cases), and “data breach” (21 cases). 
All 3 involve computers. Cases we considered fraud cases typi-
cally involved an unknown third party spoofing an e-mail’s 
origin to convince a company to transfer a large amount of 
money. In these cases, the recipient believed the e-mail to have 
come from either an executive at that company or someone that 
the company works with.416 Hacking fraud cases involved a third 
party breaking into a computer network for their own profit in a 
manner that does not seem to implicate data theft. Data breach 
 
 411. Portal Healthcare Sols., 644 F. App’x at 248. 
 412. See Data Breaches, IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., http://www 
.idtheftcenter.org/data-breaches.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2017) (“The ITRC de-
fines a data breach as an incident in which an individual name plus a Social 
Security number, driver ’s license number, medical record or financial record 
(credit/debit cards included) is potentially put at risk because of exposure.”). 
 413. See id. (“The ITRC currently tracks seven categories of data loss meth-
ods: . . . Employee Error / Negligence / Improper Disposal / Lost . . . .”). 
 414. See Y2K Bug, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC: ENCYCLOPEDIC ENTRY, https://www 
.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/Y2K-bug (last visited Oct. 6, 2017). 
 415. Id. 
 416. See, e.g., Apache Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 662 F. App’x at 252, 253 
(5th Cir. 2016). 
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cases, on the other hand, typically involved a third-party intru-
sion and data theft—though there were also cases where the 
breach was purely the result of the data caretaker’s negligence. 
For example, in April 2016, the Fourth Circuit held in a per cu-
rium opinion that, under a CGL policy, an insurer has a duty to 
defend a health care service provider in a class action stemming 
from the provider’s negligent recordkeeping system.417 For a pe-
riod of at least 4 months, Portal Healthcare Solutions, the poli-
cyholder of the present case, stored patient records for Glen Falls 
Hospital in a manner that made these records discoverable with-
out a password by anyone who searched for a patient’s name on 
Google.418 
 
Figure 4: Case Categories 
 
 417. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Portal Healthcare Sols., LLC, 644 F. App’x 245, 
248 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 418. Id. at 246. 
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Some of the cases that we looked at examined the bounda-
ries of computer fraud insurance coverage. In Apache Corp. v. 
Great American Insurance Co., an oil company challenged a 
claim denial based on the computer fraud provision of a crime 
policy.419 The underlying facts are as follows. An unknown per-
son contacted Apache by phone and claimed to represent Petro-
fac, one of Apache’s vendors.420 The caller wished to change the 
bank account that Petrofac used for receiving payments from 
Apache.421 The caller was informed that such requests must be 
in writing on official letterhead.422 A week later, the company’s 
accounts-payable department received an e-mail following up on 
this request.423 The thieves e-mailed Apache from the domain 
“petrofacltd.com” instead of “petrofac.com,” the vendor’s actual 
domain name, but the discrepancy went unnoticed.424 The ac-
count information was changed after an Apache employee called 
the phone number provided in the e-mail to verify the request.425 
Apache transferred approximately seven million dollars to this 
bank account before they discovered that the real vendor was not 
receiving the payments.426 
In an earlier section, we noted that insurance policies often 
include causation conditions like that the claim result directly 
from a particular type of occurrence. The trial court granted 
summary judgment for Apache, ruling that there was coverage 
under the computer fraud provision of the crime policy.427 The 
primary issue was whether the injury “result[ed] directly from 
the use of any computer to fraudulently cause a transfer.”428 The 
trial court reasoned that the e-mail was a substantial factor in 
the loss, so the theft did result directly from the e-mail.429 The 
Fifth Circuit disagreed, vacating the earlier judgment and ren-
dering judgment for GAI, holding that the direct cause of the loss 
 
 419. Apache Corp., 662 F. App’x. at 254. 
 420. Id. at 253. 
 421. Id. 
 422. Id. 
 423. Id. 
 424. Id. 
 425. Id. 
 426. Id. at 253–54 (suffering an actual loss of approximately $2.4 million). 
 427. Apache Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 2015 WL 7709584 (S.D. Tex., Aug. 
7, 2015), vacated, 662 F. App’x 252 (5th Cir. 2015).  
 428. Id. at *1. 
 429. Id. at *3. 
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was Apache’s failure to adequately investigate the new infor-
mation provided by the thieves.430 
Of the 146 cases in our database, 103 are trial level, 39 are 
appellate level, and 4 cases were decided by a state’s highest 
court. As Table 3 shows, insurers prevailed more often than pol-
icyholders at the trial court level, but on appeal, the difference 
between insurer success and policyholder success decreased no-
ticeably. Omitting mixed outcomes and settlements, insurers 
prevailed 67% of the time in trial court and just less than 61% of 
the time in appellate court. 
 
Table 3: Court Level and Prevailing Party 
 
Prevailing 
Party Trial Court Appellate Court 
State Supreme 
Court 
Insurer 39 20 2 
Mixed 7 5 0 
Policy holder 19 13 2 
Settled 18 0 0 
 
Of the 146 cases in our database, 13 of these cases were at 
least partially reversed on appeal. Eight times, the full or partial 
reversal affected a case where the insurer had originally pre-
vailed, and 3 times, the full or partial reversal affected a case 
where the policyholder had originally prevailed. Two times, 
there was a full or partial reversal and the decision of the lower 
court was what we considered mixed, in that the lower court held 
for the insurer on some issues and the policyholder on other is-
sues. 
 
 430. Apache Corp., 662 F. App’x at 259. Contra Medidata Sols., Inc. v. Fed. 
Ins. Co., 2017 WL 3268529, at *5–7 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2017) (addressing the 
issue under very similar circumstances—except it started with an actual 
spoofed e-mail instead of a phone call—the court did not follow the Apache court; 
the case is currently on appeal).  
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Figure 5 depicts prevailing parties for 107 cases. The out-
comes of 39 cases were unknown at the time of this writing. 
 
Figure 5. Prevailing Party by Court 
 
Not all cases concerned a traditional insurance policy. One 
case, for example, concerned a dispute over a retailer’s contract 
with a transaction processing service. In that case, the Schnuck 
supermarket chain was litigating with First Data over the 
amount Schnuck should pay for the cost of banks reissuing pay-
ment cards affected by a data breach of Schnuck’s systems.431 
The merchant payment processing agreement set a liability cap 
for the retailer at $500,000, unless certain conditions were 
met.432 Schnuck alleged that First Data was withholding more 
funds from Schnuck’s account activity than permitted under the 
contract, in order to pay the charges to the banks.433 If the 
charges were third-party fees, which is one exception to the lia-
bility cap, Schnuck’s liability would not be capped at $500,000, 
the additional withholdings would be permitted, and First Data 
could withhold the full amount from Schnuck.434 The court con-
cluded that the reissue fees charged by banks after the data 
 
 431. Schnuck Mkts., Inc. v. First Data Merch. Data Servs. Corp., 86 F. Supp. 
3d 1055, 1056 (E.D. Mo. 2015). 
 432. Id. at 1057. 
 433. Id. at 1056. 
 434. Id. at 1057. 
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breach were not third-party fees, and thus First Data was lim-
ited to recovering $500,000 from Schnuck for the fees assessed 
for card reissuance.435 
We also tracked more specific information for each case and 
coded each case for different features. For example, we tracked 
how many cases raised issues about tangible property provi-
sions, the insurer’s duty to defend, the presence of an underlying 
suit, and policy exclusions. Table 4 lists several of these factors 
and how many times they appeared in cases in federal and state 
courts. 
As shown by these excerpts, insurance cases that implicate 
digital data involve a wide range of issues. Of the 146 cases an-
alyzed, 89 of the cases involved a duty to defend, and 101 of the 
cases included discussions of policy exclusions. 
We also examined some frequently litigated issues and how 
many times a particular party prevailed when those issues were 
raised. Of particular interest was the distribution with respect 
to tangible property (generally Coverage A of a CGL policy) and 
advertising or personal injury (Coverage B). 
 
Table 4: Court Type and Issues Raised 
 
 Federal State Total 
Exclusions Raised 81 20 101 
Tangible Property and Damage 43 13 56 
Occurrence 24 2 26 
Causation 30 4 34 
Duty to Defend 69 20 89 
Publication 20 6 26 
Presence of Underlying Suit 75 19 95 
 
The total count differs in Table 5 because we omitted cases 
where the outcome was unknown or that were still ongoing. One 
unexpected observation was the distribution of settlements. 
 
 435. Id. at 1066. 
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While settlements did not account for a large number of our 
cases, over 26% of the cases we analyzed that examined personal 
or advertising injury provisions (Coverage B) ended in settle-
ment. Furthermore, excluding mixed outcome and settled cases, 
over 70% of cases that raised tangible property provisions were 
decided in the insurer’s favor, compared to 58% of advertising 
injury cases decided for the insurer. 
 
Table 5: Prevailing Party and Issues Raised 
 
 Prevailing Party 
Total 
 Insurer Mixed Policyholder Settled 
Duty to Defend 43 9 15 14 81 
Tangible Prop-
erty 29 4 12 6 51 
Loss of Use of 
Tangible Prop-
erty 
15 2 7 2 26 
Advertising In-
jury 14 1 10 9 34 
Publication 12 2 7 1 22 
Lost Business In-
come or Business 
Interruption 
6 2 9 2 19 
Policy Exclusions 48 9 24 12 93 
 
Regarding the specific characteristics or issues particular to 
each case, we employed the Pearson’s chi-squared test (χ2) to ex-
plore whether there are any statistically significant differences 
in the 29 issues/characteristics436 with respect to the prevailing 
 
 436. The twenty-nine variables that we tracked through the cases are: the 
presence of causation issues, discussion of whether an incident was an “occur-
rence” under the policy, whether a claim implicated covered property, whether 
the loss occurred on premises, the presence of computer fraud coverage, claims 
for lost business income or business interruption, language in policies about ac-
tions in the course of business, advertising or personal injury, tangible property 
or physical damage, loss of use of tangible property, policy coverage for inten-
tional or accidental events, data loss as personal injury, insurance provisions 
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party, either an insurer or a policyholder. The results suggest 
that the only statistically significant issues between cases where 
the insurer prevailed versus cases where the policyholder pre-
vailed are the duty to defend and the lost business income or 
business interruption. 
Excluding mixed outcome and settled cases, over 74% of 
cases which raised duty to defend provisions were upheld in the 
insurer’s favor. This is statistically significantly higher than the 
portion of cases upheld in the policyholder’s favor, as shown by 
the Pearson chi-squared test (p-value = 0.09). This result sug-
gests that insurers are more likely to win a case where the issue 
of duty to defend was raised. Further, 72% of cases not involving 
an issue regarding lost business income or business interruption 
were upheld in the insurer’s favor (p-value = 0.01), suggesting 
that insurers are more likely to win the case if the policyholder 
does not address an issue about their lost business income or 
business interruption.  
We also employed the Pearson chi-squared test to explore 
statistically significant differences in the 29 issues with respect 
to whether the cases were settled or litigated to an outcome. 
Eighty-seven percent of cases which raised an issue about policy 
exclusions did not result in a settlement (p-value = 0.03), sug-
gesting that parties are less likely to settle if any policy exclusion 
provisions were raised in the case.437 
Appearing in over 69% of cases analyzed, policy exclusions 
are clearly an important consideration in litigation involving 
data and risk shifting. We identified 44 individual exclusions. 
 
concerning work completed by the policyholder, insurance concerns about dam-
ages, coverage or incident timing issues, publication, policy exclusions, coverage 
for malicious third-party acts, the presence of an underlying suit, valuation of 
harm issues, duty to defend or indemnify, standing for plaintiffs in underlying 
litigation, security preconditions of policy, policy caps, cases that implicate the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), cases that implicate the Telephone Con-
sumer Protection Act (TCPA), reference to privacy injuries, cases that empha-
size first party policy coverage, and cases with no court order. 
 437. Among the other twenty-nine issues, we found statistically significant 
differences in issues about coverage or incident timing (p-value = 0.01), standing 
for plaintiffs in underlying litigation (p-value = 0.03), and insurance concerns 
about damages (p-value = 0.06) with respect to settled versus the non-settled 
(i.e., litigated to an outcome) cases. Our results suggest that a case is less likely 
to be settled if these three issues were not raised, even though most of the cases 
in our sample were litigated to an outcome, regardless of these three issues. 
However, we caution that the number of settled cases in our dataset is rather 
small. 
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Many cases involved multiple exclusions. The most common sin-
gular exclusion concerned breach of contract or a failure of the 
insured to deliver a product or service as promised. This exclu-
sion or a close variation of it appeared in 23 of the 101 cases 
where exclusions were an issue. There were 15 cases where an 
argument emphasized an exclusion written into the definition of 
a word in the policy, and 13 cases with arguments concerning 
exclusions for claims involving infringement of intellectual prop-
erty rights by the insured. There were also 12 cases that dis-
cussed exceptions to exclusions. 
We categorized these exclusions into nine categories: (1) ex-
clusions pertaining to company operations; (2) computer-related 
exclusions; (3) exclusions regarding contracts, warranties, or 
quality; (4) definitional exclusions; (5) environmental exclu-
sions;438 (6) exclusions pertaining to a violation of rights or law 
by the insured; (7) exclusions based on occurrences taking place 
prior to the policy period; (8) property-related exclusions; and (9) 
a category for other types of exclusions that did not fit in the 
preceding categories. 
The category for other types of exclusions included: (1) stat-
utory exclusions; (2) the exclusion of claims because they should 
be covered by one of the policyholder’s other insurance policies; 
(3) the exclusion of claims because they pertain to excluded dam-
ages, such as regulatory fines or punitive damage awards; (4) 
exclusions for unexplained loss; and (5) exclusions for claims 
where the loss was considered too indirect or remote for coverage 
to apply. 
 
 438. This category refers to aspects of the physical environment, like storms. 
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Figure 6: Exclusion Categories 
 
C. IMPLICATIONS 
In this Part, we have presented our analysis of litigation 
over insurance coverage. The analysis highlights a number of re-
curring themes that insurers, policyholders, and lawyers will 
need to take into consideration. 
Trying to use CGL policies to cover the full range of risks to 
Internet-connected businesses is enormously problematic. Cur-
rently, CGL policies are not very effective because of the uncer-
tainty about how CGL policies apply to computer-related losses. 
One current observation about data-breach litigation is that 
plaintiffs are experimenting with various theories for liability.439 
This is also the case with insurance coverage litigation that 
arises because of those cases.440 
We noted above that standard CGL policies include multiple 
types of coverage, two of which are referred to as Coverage A and 
Coverage B. When litigating over coverage for data incidents, 
some policyholders argue that the injury is covered under the 
 
 439. See Chad Hemenway, Most Cyber D&O Cases So Far Unsuccessful, but 
Plaintiffs’ Attorneys Will ‘Continue To Experiment,’ ADVISEN FRONT PAGE NEWS 
(Jan. 27, 2017), http://www.advisen.com/tools/fpnproc/fpns/articles_new_1/P/ 
274388974.html (“[P]laintiffs’ attorneys ‘continue to experiment’ despite the dis-
missals of the past . . . .”).  
 440. See id. (“Plaintiffs’ lawyers are looking for the right kind of case, or the 
right kind of fact pattern.”). 
4
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bodily injury and property damage provisions of Coverage A,441 
while others argue that the injury is covered under the personal 
and advertising injury provisions of Coverage B.442 Our empiri-
cal examination of cases revealed that insurers tended to prevail 
more, relative to the policyholder, in litigation involving prop-
erty damage provisions. Furthermore, a higher percentage of the 
advertising injury cases that we analyzed ended in settlements 
compared to cases involving claims for property damage. This 
suggests that litigation based on Coverage B of a CGL policy en-
counters more outcome uncertainty than litigation based on Cov-
erage A. 
The Portal case suggests that in some jurisdictions, courts 
may find that standard CGL policies cover harms from data-re-
lated incidents.443 At the same time, the Apache court warns lit-
igants that causation analysis may render inapplicable specific 
policy provisions targeting computer fraud.444 Should a CGL pol-
icy cover intangible harms like the deletion or exposure of data? 
Should a computer fraud policy cover injuries from employees 
not looking closely enough at information in an e-mail? 
Insurers and policyholders should take care with policy ele-
ments like anti-concurrent causation language as digital injuries 
begin to be insured separately from tangible injuries. As the 
Apache case shows, the line between computer fraud and regular 
fraud may be blurry because thieves operate across multiple 
spaces.445 
Our analysis also raises questions about the specific lan-
guage of provisions in the Coverage A and Coverage B sections 
of a CGL policy. The Portal case involved policy language cover-
ing advertising injuries and personal injuries, with both types of 
injuries being defined as including a publication that “gives un-
reasonable publicity to [a person’s] private li[fe].”446 In the Portal 
case, the Fourth Circuit held for the policyholder by reasoning 
 
 441. RSVT Holdings, LLC v. Main St. Am. Assur. Co., 136 A.D.3d 1196, 1198 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2016). 
 442. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Portal Healthcare Sols., L.L.C., 35 F. Supp. 3d 
765, 767 (E.D. Va. 2014), aff ’d per curiam, 644 F. App’x 245, 246 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 443. See id. at 248. 
 444. See Apache Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 662 F. App’x 252, 253 (5th Cir. 
2016). 
 445. Id. at 259 (“Apache failed to investigate accurately the new, but fraud-
ulent, information provided to it.”). 
 446. Portal Healthcare Sols., 644 F. App’x at 247 (quoting Travelers Indem. 
Co., 35 F. Supp. at 771). 
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that the exposure of confidential patient information was a pub-
lication, even when there was no indication that anyone other 
than the patients themselves accessed the records online.447 
On the other hand, the RSVT Holdings case focused on prop-
erty damage provisions of a CGL policy to provide coverage for a 
data breach involving financial information.448 There, the poli-
cyholder argued that the theft of customer credit card infor-
mation was property damage under the policy.449 The insurer 
prevailed in RSVT Holdings because electronic data was ex-
cluded from the definition of tangible property under the pol-
icy.450 These two cases suggest that data breaches can be covered 
by CGL policies based on the exposure being a publication and 
thus covered as an advertising or personal injury, but arguments 
for coverage based on the data breach amounting to property 
damage are likely to fail, especially in the presence of exclusions 
for electronic data. 
As described in the earlier Section, we found a statistically 
significant relationship between the prevailing party variable 
and two of our other variables: duty to defend, and business in-
terruption coverage. Cases that examined the duty to defend 
were more likely to favor the insurer, while cases that involved 
business interruption coverage were more likely to favor the pol-
icyholder. The duty to defend generally arises in the context of 
third-party liability policies. Business interruption coverage, on 
the other hand, is more often an issue in first-party business and 
property insurance policies. This may indicate greater sympathy 
for policyholders whose businesses are harmed. It could also in-
dicate that policyholders can offer better arguments for coverage 
in the well-established area of business interruption policy pro-
visions. However, applying general liability principles to data 
losses affecting third parties (where the duty to defend is most 
relevant), is more challenging. Analogies between data and prop-
erty may face an uphill climb in a court system that functions 
best with easily quantifiable harms.  
 
 447. Id. at 247–48. 
 448. RSVT Holdings, LLC v. Main St. Am. Assur. Co., 136 A.D.3d 1196, 1198 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2016). 
 449. Id. 
 450. Id. (“Crucially, the policy further states that . . . ‘electric data is not tan-
gible property.’”). 
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Our database also indicates that litigation over issues of cov-
erage for data breaches and other intangible harms has in-
creased significantly since 2011. Even as we start getting clearer 
answers to questions about data breaches as publications and 
data breaches as property damage, the increasing volume of 
cases spells trouble. As cyberattacks become even more preva-
lent, businesses will need ways of managing their risk in and out 
of the courtroom. A strong cyberinsurance market with new 
cyber-specific insurance products could mitigate the uncertainty 
of litigation and provide incentives for investing in cybersecure 
infrastructure and achieving good computer hygiene. 
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS   
As technology becomes more intertwined with life and busi-
ness, risk shifting becomes more important. Many CGL policies 
use language that is ambiguous about electronic data issues, and 
courts are faced with a significant task when evaluating how this 
policy language should apply to risks faced by modern busi-
nesses. The Fourth Circuit’s decision in the Portal case indicates 
a willingness to interpret CGL policies as covering cyber 
events.451 Many insurance providers are troubled by this be-
cause of the lack of actuarial data for cyber events. CGL policies 
are typically issued with a fairly good idea of what the existing 
risks are, but the occurrence and financial consequences of cyber 
events are currently unpredictable. The empirical analysis of the 
insurance lawsuits that we presented above underscores the 
need for new insurance products directed at specifically covering 
cyber risks and harms.  
Insurers are in a unique position to push companies to adopt 
more consistently secure data-security practices, including en-
cryption, firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and stronger in-
ternal controls for data handling. As private-sector participants 
with a more direct relationship to the policyholders, the insurers 
could impose the kind of Best Available Control Technology 
standards that the EPA imposes on polluters under the Clean 
Air Act. Compared to federal or state regulators though, insurers 
are in a better position to communicate directly with policyhold-
ers and conduct audits to ensure policyholders’ security stand-
ards keep up with technological developments. It could also ben-
efit insurance companies and the public interest for insurers to 
 
 451. Portal Healthcare Sols., 644 F. App’x at 246.  
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invest in cybersecurity research aimed at protecting commercial 
enterprises. 
A. ADDRESSING COVERAGE ISSUES 
Our analysis in Part IV illustrates the scope of litigation 
over coverage for many of the intangible harms that are difficult 
to insure. We noted in Part III that insurers are increasingly 
narrowing policies, and our analysis supports this observation. 
Exclusions for electronic data may prevent data breaches from 
being covered as property damage. After Portal, it is possible 
that more insurers will exclude data breaches from coverage as 
publications of sensitive personal information. The record of lit-
igation supports a trend towards market segmentation with the 
introduction of more accessible cyberinsurance policies. 
Cyber events are currently being addressed through civil lit-
igation, though our research indicates a fair amount of contro-
versy over the application of different types of insurance cover-
age and how courts will interpret them. Perhaps what is needed 
is a centralized location where insurance coverage and data-
breach litigation are viewed as parts of the same whole, provid-
ing more insight into the interactions between risk management 
and the experiences of consumers. The Internet has already 
eroded national borders. Maybe now there should be some kind 
of organization that erodes the borders between managing risks 
and responding to risks. The insurance industry has great po-
tential to stimulate investment in cybersecure infrastructure 
and improved computer hygiene across the private sector, but it 
cannot do it alone. 
Perhaps a third-party organization, such as the RAND Cor-
poration or the Information Technology and Innovation Founda-
tion for Policy, could bring together thought leaders from the 
fields of economics, law, insurance, and computer security to 
evaluate risks and propose solutions. Intersectoral cooperation 
could help address uncertainties associated with emerging risks. 
A dedicated cybersecurity think tank could collaborate with ISO, 
NAIC, CERT, other private organizations, and various govern-
ment agencies to get everyone speaking the same language as 
we work towards addressing the cybersecurity threats that cre-
ate uncertainty in courtrooms, board rooms, and living rooms. 
The key is to reduce informational asymmetries so that in-
surers can more easily track their own risks and policyholders 
can anticipate coverage issues. Ideally, this kind of collaboration 
 270 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:191 
 
would reduce litigation in addition to reducing uncertainty. Our 
second recommendation is more explicitly focused on reducing 
informational asymmetries. 
B. IMPROVING RISK ASSESSMENT 
Insurance policies are becoming more available for cyber 
risks, and the policy language is becoming more focused on spe-
cific problems faced by insurers and policyholders. Yet there is a 
serious need for more information. Insurers still lack enough in-
formation to make measured decisions about how to design the 
policies, what the conditions of the policies should be, what the 
policy caps should be, and a variety of other issues. For this rea-
son, we strongly support the DHS in its efforts to develop the 
CIDAR, in order to improve technological risk assessment, in-
cluding the size of the potential losses, brought about by the 
presence of vulnerabilities in computer software and hardware. 
The Cyber Incident Data and Analysis Working Group 
(CIDAWG) of DHS published a white paper detailing the pro-
posed structure of CIDAR.452 The sixteen proposed categories in-
clude broad information like the type and severity of the inci-
dent, and more specific information about the victim 
organization, such as its information security practices and pro-
cedures at the time of the incident and whether the incident was 
caused by a failure of a security control, how the incident was 
detected, how the organization responded to the incident, and 
costs incurred as a result.453 
CIDAR is envisioned as a voluntary and anonymous way to 
“share, store, aggregate, and analyze sensitive cyber incident 
 
 452. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTABLISHING COMMUNITY-RELEVANT 
DATA CATEGORIES IN SUPPORT OF A CYBER INCIDENT DATA REPOSITORY 1 
(2015), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Data%20Categories 
%20White%20Paper%20FINAL_v3b.pdf (outlining the basis of a future reposi-
tory development effort).  
 453. Id. at 1–2 (helping the private and public sector organizations assess 
cyber risks, identify effective controls, and improve risk management practice). 
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data.”454 If implemented, CIDAR would greatly aid in risk as-
sessment activities and reduce informational asymmetries.455 
We have compiled our database of insurance cases about com-
puter-related claims as a complement to a program like CIDAR. 
Insurers and policyholders will greatly benefit from a centralized 
database of cyber-incident information. These parties will also 
benefit from our CLAD, which traces the application of law to 
these disputes. 
Ultimately, what policyholders and insurers need more of is 
information. CIDAR and CLAD can work together to help these 
parties evaluate risks and legal implications. Data breaches and 
cyberattacks can have serious financial implications for busi-
nesses, and as such, the interest in cyberinsurance policies is 
growing.456 In addition to tracking incidents and litigation, there 
should also be a centralized collection of information about 
emerging security threats and patterns. By providing access to a 
range of data, the government or third-party organization in 
charge of CIDAR can support insurers and policyholders in their 
ongoing efforts to manage modern information security risks. 
C. ALTERNATIVE RISK TRANSFER 
By maintaining a comprehensive repository of information 
about cybersecurity research and events, policy makers, insur-
ers, and policyholders will be able to observe and respond to 
trends. However, it is not enough just to know that things hap-
pen. 
The growth of the cyberinsurance market offers an amazing 
opportunity to test the viability of alternative risk-transfer 
methods on a large scale. In analyzing cases, we found that a lot 
of policyholders and insurers are still relying on traditional CGL 
 
 454. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE VALUE PROPOSITION FOR A CYBER 
INCIDENT DATA REPOSITORY 1 (2015), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 
publications/dhs-value-proposition-white-paper-2015_v2.pdf. For some criti-
cism of voluntary models of cybersecurity regulation, see Jay P. Kesan and 
Carol M. Hayes, Creating a “Circle of Trust” To Further Digital Privacy and 
Cybersecurity Goals, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1475, 1537–40, 1543 (“[A] purely 
voluntary approach to either cyber threat information sharing or technology 
adoption could hinder the effectiveness of the programs . . . .”). 
 455. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 452. 
 456. See Ed Silverstein, Does Your Company Have Cyber-Insurance?, INSIDE 
COUNSEL (May 12, 2016), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2016/05/12/does-your 
-company-have-cyber-insurance (stating the average total cost of a single cyber-
attack is $6.5 million).  
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policies when a cyber event occurs. While the uncertainties sur-
rounding cyber coverage currently make premiums and returns 
unpredictable at best, there are two alternative risk-transfer ap-
proaches that may be particularly applicable to the cyber risk 
market: securitization and captive insurance. 
Securitization of cyber risks could resemble catastrophe 
bonds, like Credit Suisse’s recent issuance of bonds aimed at mit-
igating internal risks like cyberattacks, accounting errors, and 
rogue traders.457 Bonds are a debt security and are a way to loan 
money to the bond issuer, which will generally be repaid with 
interest at the maturity date.458 Catastrophe bonds tend to have 
a higher interest rate relative to, say, government bonds, be-
cause there is a greater risk that the full value of the bond will 
be lost.459 This may make bonds an unappealing option for solely 
shifting cyber risk because of the lack of risk diversity, but this 
can be addressed by following a model similar to Credit Suisse 
and using the bond to cover multiple possible causes of loss in 
addition to cyber risk.460 
We have also previously analyzed the potential for using fi-
nancial instruments as a tool to quantify and transfer risks as-
sociated with software security vulnerabilities.461 In this kind of 
market, insurance companies might elect to participate in the 
market by taking short or long positions on contracts for security 
vulnerabilities of different severity tiers.462 These kinds of in-
vestments could allow companies to hedge their risks against ad-
verse cyber events.463 This approach could potentially be struc-
tured to supplement catastrophe bonds for cybersecurity events. 
 
 457. See Jan-Henrik Forster & Oliver Suess, Credit Suisse Said To Study 
Novel Bond Sale To Offload Risk, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Apr. 21, 2016), https:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-22/credit-suisse-said-to-study 
-novel-bond-sale-to-offload-bank-risk. 
 458. Lisa Smith, Why Companies Issue Bonds, INVESTOPEDIA http://www 
.investopedia.com/articles/investing/062813/why-companies-issue-bonds.asp 
(last visited Oct. 6, 2017). 
 459. See Forster & Suess, supra note 457, at 1 (“The insurance industry uses 
so-called cat bonds to limit exposure to disasters such as hurricanes and earth-
quakes. Investors get above-market yields for taking a chance on their money 
being wiped out.”).  
 460. Id. 
 461. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 30. 
 462. See id. at 821. 
 463. See id. 
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Another possibility is to shift the focus away from tradi-
tional insurance companies and consider addressing cyberinsur-
ance problems through a captive insurance approach. When a 
business is deciding how to address various risks, two options 
include self-insurance and third-party insurance. Captive insur-
ance is a third option that occupies a middle ground between 
self-insurance and traditional insurance, where the company 
that needs insurance creates a dedicated subsidiary for this pur-
pose.464 Operating a captive insurance company can often retain 
the tax benefits of paying insurance premiums to a third party, 
because the IRS generally considers premiums paid to a captive 
insurance company to be tax-deductible business expenses.465 
Unlike with traditional insurance, however, the premiums re-
main in the company family, and can be invested.466 Operating 
a licensed captive insurance company can also enable participa-
tion in the reinsurance market.467 
D. GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN THE CYBERINSURANCE 
MARKET 
We have noted that there is a lot of interest in CIDAR as a 
tool for improving risk assessment for cyber insurance. As we 
discussed in earlier sections, precedent for government involve-
ment in the cyberinsurance market can be observed with work-
ers’ compensation and NFIP.468 NFIP provides a partial model 
for a partnership between the government and private sector on 
cyberinsurance. As noted above, however, the NFIP model is far 
from perfect. NFIP premiums are often regarded as too low, and 
the protection of a federally subsidized flood insurance program 
arguably creates incentives for more people to move to places at 
high risk for flooding, thus aggravating the moral hazard prob-
lem that is already prevalent with insurance.469 Nonetheless, a 
government program supporting the cyberinsurance market 
could support market growth. We are especially focused on two 
aspects of a potential cyberinsurance regime: voluntariness, and 
the presence of subsidies. 
 
 464. Constance A. Anastopoulo, Taking No Prisoners: Captive Insurance as 
an Alternative to Traditional or Commercial Insurance, 8 OHIO ST. ENTREPRE-
NEURIAL BUS. L.J. 209, 213 (2013). 
 465. Id. at 213–14. 
 466. See id. at 216–17. 
 467. See id. at 224. 
 468. See supra Part II.C. 
 469. See supra notes 369–78 and accompanying text. 
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One option is to require companies, or at least companies in 
some sectors, to carry cyberinsurance. In their research, Pal et 
al. note that a voluntary cyberinsurance system may be inade-
quate for the goal of maximizing social welfare, because security 
is a public good.470 A mandatory cyberinsurance program avoids 
the problem of high-risk parties purchasing a disproportionate 
share of insurance policies and creating a lemons market.471 This 
is one reason why most states require drivers to carry automo-
bile insurance, why employers are required to carry workers’ 
compensation insurance, and why the Affordable Care Act re-
quires all citizens to have health insurance. On the other hand, 
some experts claim that voluntary programs have lower costs 
than mandatory programs,472 and Kant’s paradox of freedom im-
plicitly warns that there is a delicate balance between regula-
tions that benefit the less powerful and regulations that reduce 
freedom. 
As a policy matter, should cyberinsurance be treated in a 
manner similar to workers’ compensation? Employers have to 
carry insurance in case workers get injured on the job, so per-
haps companies that collect and store personal information 
should be required to carry insurance to guard against com-
puter-based risks. Such a program could potentially be cost pro-
hibitive for smaller businesses. A middle ground may be desira-
ble, where cyberinsurance is mandatory for some industries or 
some sectors of the economy involving critical infrastructure, but 
not for others. For example, critical infrastructure industries 
like transportation and power companies should be required to 
carry cyberinsurance, but not smaller businesses like retailers 
that are more focused on brick-and-mortar locations. There could 
be positive spillover effects from the mandatory industries in 
terms of technology improvements, and the assured premiums 
from these industries might enable the cyberinsurance providers 
to offer more competitive rates for smaller businesses that want 
coverage for cyber events. 
Another aspect to consider is the extent of government sub-
sidies for both insurance and security technology. There are 
many ways that such a system could be designed. For example, 
 
 470. Pal et al., supra note 18. 
 471. Id. at 6. 
 472. Sidney A. Shapiro & Randy Rabinowitz, Voluntary Regulatory Compli-
ance in Theory and Practice: The Case of OSHA, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 97, 100 
(2000) (citing E. Donald Elliot, Environmental TQM: Anatomy of a Pollution 
Control Program That Works!, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1840, 1848 (1994)). 
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the tax code might be revised to introduce tax credits for cyber-
security investments or cyberinsurance premiums. The subsi-
dies could also take on the form used in NFIP, with the govern-
ment subsidizing part of the cyberinsurance premiums to offset 
the uncertainty experienced by both insurers and policyhold-
ers.473 As the market develops, the need for a subsidy should be 
lessened by the introduction of more thorough information about 
threats and responses. But, as with NFIP, careful attention 
must be paid to ensure that the program does not incentivize 
reckless behavior.474 
Another option for government involvement is to emphasize 
the role of courts to adjust common-law ideas of privacy injuries 
to be more in line with modern risks. William Prosser’s 1960 ar-
ticle Privacy revolutionized how courts approached privacy liti-
gation by identifying four privacy torts: (1) intrusion upon seclu-
sion; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) false light publicity; 
and (4) appropriation of name or likeness.475 But Prosser’s 
framework has proven to be very rigid and, consequently, very 
limiting in the modern world.476 
Unfortunately for modern plaintiffs, Prosser viewed privacy 
violations as proprietary injuries, not mental or personal inju-
ries,477 and this focus on privacy as a proprietary injury can be 
seen in a slightly different form in standing challenges to data-
breach litigation. The first element of Article III standing under 
the law is that there must be an injury-in-fact, defined in part as 
an invasion of a legally protected interest.478 If courts viewed 
data insecurity (that is, personal data not being secure anymore) 
as an injury, and thus considered plaintiffs injured the moment 
their personal information is compromised, uncertainty in data-
breach litigation would significantly decrease. If courts ex-
panded their understanding of privacy injuries to include recov-
ering from compromised personal data or privacy invasions (for 
example, the time and effort spent in replacing compromised 
credit cards or paying for future credit monitoring) and include 
 
 473. See supra Part II.C. 
 474. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 475. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser ’s Privacy Law: A Mixed 
Legacy, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1887, 1889–90 (2010) (citing William L. Prosser, Pri-
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 476. Id. at 1890 (stating that Prosser ’s skepticism of privacy law made it 
difficult for the law to adapt to future circumstances).  
 477. Id. at 1916 (citing Prosser, supra note 475, at 406).  
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injuries that do not, at the moment the lawsuit is filed, have a 
dollar value attached, uncertainty for insurers would also de-
crease and allow civil litigation risks to be more reliably esti-
mated. 
  CONCLUSION   
Cybersecurity events can be hugely disruptive for busi-
nesses, governments, and the economy. In this Article, we focus 
on efforts to address these new risks. In order to understand the 
legal risk in policy coverage, we performed an empirical study of 
146 insurance cases that are relevant to electronic data issues 
and insurance policy coverage to evaluate how these issues are 
currently playing out in courts across the country. Our findings 
reflect a litigation environment more favorable towards insurers 
at the trial level, with most cases brought in federal court being 
resolved within three years. We demonstrate how the use of CGL 
policies to cover cyber losses is unpredictable and problematic, 
thereby underscoring the need for more cyber-specific insurance 
products. 
This analysis provides a starting point for further discussion 
and development of the cyberinsurance market. By providing a 
theoretical analysis of problems in the insurance industry and a 
practical view of insurance litigation involving harm that is often 
hard to predict, see, and value, we hope to provide support for 
the development of much needed, better insurance products. In-
tersectoral collaboration to improve risk assessment, including 
technological risk, legal risk and portfolio risk, would be a huge 
boon for insurers, their clients, the cybersecurity industry, and 
society in general. 
As interest grows in specialized cyberinsurance, insurers 
and policyholders will need to collect and analyze a lot of infor-
mation. DHS’s CIDAR proposal provides one potential tool that 
can ease this transition. Insurers and potential policyholders 
may also consider alternative risk-transfer mechanisms, like ca-
tastrophe bonds and risk securitization. Effective cyber risk 
management could support cybersecurity improvements and 
strengthen critical infrastructure against developing threats. 
Cooperation at all levels of society, from the government to in-
surance companies, small businesses, and individual consumers, 
can facilitate the development of a stronger and more resilient 
world. 
